Russian-Georgian conflict (2008) (President McCain)

The Russian-Georgian war of 2008 was between Russia and the small Caucasian nation of Georgia in 2008, over the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Georgia had gained independence following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Subsequently, it chose to align itself with NATO and the West rather than Russia. Russia retaliated by supported ethnic seperatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two regions bordering Russia seeking to break away to form their own nations or merge with Russia, as well as deporting thousands of ethnic Georgians living in Russia by sending them home on crowded cargo planes, while the hundreds of thousands who remained faced racism and discrimination.

Georgia built up its military strength with help from the United States and NATO, but was unable to take back Abkhazia and South Ossetia due to Russian training and arming of rebel fighters, and the presence of Russian peacekeepers, who did not allow the return of Georgian villagers who were expelled from Abkhazia and South Ossetia during the wars. Georgia had to absorb the refugees on its own territory, and sign the Sochi Agreement, which let the Georgian Army deploy a small number of peacekeeping troops to defend the Georgian villages still present.

Georgia continued to defy Russian influence. The Georgian military bought military equipment and received training from the West, and applied for NATO membership. It continued to maintain a cultural and linguistic identity completely seperate from Russia, democratically elected a pro-American President against a pro-Russian one, and refused to teach Russian in its schools. Although Russia could not do anything about Georgia's ethnic separation, it was absolutely unwilling to allow it to join NATO. Georgian membership in NATO would give Russia a feeling of being surrounded by a hostile threat, and would jeopardize its influence in its own backyard.

Russia wanted to intervene, but was unwilling to go all-out and invade Georgia. It could not absorb a completely seperate country with a hostile population, but it wanted a small-scale war which would hopefully pressure the Georgian people to seek closer economic and military relations with Russia, abstain from joining NATO, and elect a pro-Russian government.

Leadup to War
The South Ossetian authorities, under influence of Russia, began instigating small-scale clashes between Georgian peacekeepers and Ossetian militia and Russian peacekeepers in early August 2008. Five Georgians and six Ossetian miliamen and Russian peacekeepers were killed. On 6 August, the evacuation of Ossetian women and children was completed. On 6 and 7 August, there were continuous exchanges of shelling. In the afternoon of 7 August, two Georgian peacekeepers were killed when their checkpoint was fired on. Shortly afterward, Georgia began massing tanks, infantry, and artillery along the South Ossetian and Abkhazian borders, and withdrew their peacekeepers. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili delievered a television address to the Ossetian people, asking them to negotiate and abstain from violence, after which Ossetian mortar shelling increased.

Saakashvili initially abandoned secret plans drawn up years earlier, instead preferring to take back only Tskhinvali, thinking that U.S. President John McCain would diplomatically block any Russian attack. However, at the last minute, he heeded U.S. warnings that it might not be able to help, and realized that the U.S. might not want war with a semi-superpower over a small Caucasian nation. He decided to stick to his original plans to make it tougher for Russia to intervene.

Georgian attack
The Georgians put in action an attack plan drawn up two years earlier, by President Saakashvili and Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili. The plan called for a two-pronged operation in South Ossetia, with the main objectives being the Roki Tunnel and Java, and a secondary objective being Tskhinvali, and an invasion into Abkhazia. Once the Roki Tunnel was destroyed and Abkhazia was taken, Russia would find it difficult to pour in troops and tanks.

The Georgians began a massive attack on South Ossetia on the night on 7 August, utilizing mortars, heavy assault guns, rocket launchers, and Sukhoi Su-25 attack jets. Rather than simply bombarding Tskhinvali, as Saakashvili had originally intended, the Georgians shelled Java and the Roki tunnel area, where the bulk of South Ossetian forces were stationed, and government targets in Tskhinvali, carefully avoiding the Russian peacekeeping base. This was designed to minimize civilian casualties and give the Russians less of an excuse to intervene.

At the same time, Georgian ground and naval artillery fire and air attacks hit government and military targets throughout Abkhazia, especially along the borders. Abkhazian and Russian ground forces were damaged, and the small Abkhazia air and naval forces were wiped out. The Georgian Navy subsequently imposed an effective naval blockade of Abkhazia.

The Georgians began two thrusts supported by armor and airstrikes. One entered Tskhinvali, and engaged in urban combat with the Ossetian militia and Russian peacekeeping battalion in the city, while another one headed towards Java, clearing out the remnants of Ossetian forces in those areas, and blasting the Roki Tunnel. Meanwhile, Tskhinvali fell after fierce urban combat, and the Georgians subsequently cleared out any remaining pockets of resistance, controlling South Ossetia the following day.

At the same time, Georgian forces launched an armored thrust into Abkhazia. The Russian and Abkhazian defenders, already bruised from extensive airstrikes, were quickly swept back, and the Georgians controlled Abkhazia by the following day.

U.S. President John McCain decided not to intervene, but realized that Russia would intervene, so he sent Georgia a massive shipment of arms and munitions.