Talk:The Cold War Turns Hot

Transport Capacity and Logistics
Throughout the entire OTL Cold War, the CCCP never had enough long-range amphibious capability to transport more than half of their Naval Infantry (about 30,000) on anything less than a few jaunts around the Baltic. They would certainly have had enough short-range landing vessels to make an attack on Alaska feasible, but the North Pacific is a treacherous place to be sailing in, no matter what your vessel. Not to mention that the USA had a massive, well-trained and -equipped fleet whose senior officers had fought in the Pacific during WWII, and the CCCP's officers were mainly sub freaks and political commissars. Their surface fleets were pretty bare-bones in terms of funding from WWII on to about 1970, when the whole "Carrier Power!" fad that had been so popular in the West began to trickle into the minds of Soviet officers and planners (though I'll bet that your ATL chairman is going to change that ;).

Even more, Siberia is a long, long way from the settled regions of Russia. Even if given an unlimited amount of rail going between Europe and the Pacific coast, the sheer time it would take to transport provisions, munitions, spare parts, fuel, etc., would be a death blow to an operation of the size, complexity, and secrecy that the CCCP carried out in this ATL. For one, it would be so innefficient that the operation would take years to plan and execute. That given, any Western spy or analyst worth their salt is going to see what's going on, and it doesn't take more than a couple months to shift your fleets around (especially in a nation like the US with many very well-developed port cities.

Overall, it is an excellent TL, but some parts need rethinking.

BoredMatt 20:39, January 5, 2011 (UTC)