Board Thread:Timeline Discussions/@comment-217.111.76.245-20140508135646/@comment-3428312-20140727065150

I disagree Anon, because of the simple fact the Soviet manpower was increasingly approaching exhaustion in 1944. For proof, here are some sources:

"Bagration, 1944", Osprey Campaign Series (Pg 27-28) -

"Soviet rifle divisions were generally smaller than their german counterparts, averaging 2500-4000 troops. At the time of Operation Bagration a concerted efort was made to bring these units up to an average of 6000 troops."

"Red Army Handbook", (Pg 32) -

" By this time, however, it was becoming apparent that the Soviet force structure of 500-plus Divisions simply exceeded their capacity to support it. [..] in mid-1944 more drastic action was neccesary. Either some of the rifle divisions would have to be demobilized and their personell used to fill out other units, or divisional strengths for below envisioned norms would have to be accepted. The  Stavka opted for the latter alternative."

"Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev, 1915-1991", (Pg 172)

"Soviet sources reflect manpower deficiencies by emphasizing the low strength of rifle units and the draconian measures used to enlist soldiers in liberated regions. By 1945 Soviet rifle divisions were often understrength, with only 3,500 to 5,000 men each."

The likely result of a faied D-Day is a German-Soviet armstice, with the Anglo-Americans following suit not long after.