Hindenburg Program (Our Place in the Sun)

The Hindenburg Program of August 1916 is the name given to the armaments, production, and economic policy enacted by the German General Staff (Third Oberste Heeresleitung), consisting of Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff, in late 1916. Hindenburg and Ludendorff were appointed following the sacking of General Erich von Falkenhayn in late August 1916 and aimed to further increase the militarization of the German economy and place a new, much greater emphasis on tanks and the motorization of the German army.

Cambrai Conference
On 8 September, Hindenburg and Ludendorff held a conference at Cambrai with the chiefs of staff of the armies of the Westheer as part of a tour of inspection of the Western Front. Both men were dismayed at the nature of trench warfare that they found, in such contrast to the conditions on the Eastern Front and the dilapidated state of the Westheer. The Battle of Verdun and the Battle of the Somme had been extraordinarily costly and on the Somme, 122,908 German casualties had been suffered from 24 June to 28 August. The battle had required the use of 29 divisions and by September, one division each day had to be withdrawn and replaced by a fresh one. The Chief of Staff of Heeresgruppe Deutscher Kronprinz (Army Group German Crown Prince) reported that conditions at Verdun were little better and that the recruit depots behind the army group front could supply only 50–60 percent of the casualty replacements needed. From July to August the Westheer had fired the equivalent of 587 trainloads of field gun shells, for the receipt of only 470 from Germany and the munitions shortage was worsening.

On 29 August, Hindenburg and Ludendorff reorganized the army groups on the Western Front, by incorporating all but the 4th Army in Flanders into the army group structure on the active part of the Western Front. The administrative reorganization eased the distribution of men and equipment, yet made no difference to the lack of numbers and to the growing Franco-British superiority in weapons and ammunition. New divisions were needed and the manpower for them and replacements for the losses of 1916 had to be found. The superiority in manpower enjoyed by the Entente and its allies could not be surpassed but Hindenburg and Ludendorff drew on ideas from Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant-Colonel) Max Bauer of the Operations Section at OHL HQ in Mézières, for a further industrial mobilization, to equip the army for the materialschlacht (battle of equipment/battle of attrition) being inflicted on it in France. Hindenburg reasoned that while German manpower alone could not overcome the strategic imbalance on the western front, superior equipment and tactics could render enemy numerical superiority inconsequential. Ludendorff, though in agreement with Hindenburg’s plan, was markedly more pessimistic about German prospects for victory on the western front.

The Kriegsamt
See also: Kriegsamt (Our Place in the Sun)

Following the adoption of the program, a new administrative body, the Kriegsamt (Supreme War Office) was founded on 1 November to take control of German production and organization. The body was headed by Wilhelm Groener, a railway expert. The creation of the body was intended to give the Third OHL greater control over the economy and expand the militarization of the German economy through bureaucratic overhead. Among the activities of the Kriegsamt were the closings of non-essential enterprises and oversight of worker transfers. After the war, the Kriegsamt project came under heavy criticism as unnecessary and actually detrimental to the war effort because it placed a counterproductive strain on the German economy and working class. Many have argued that while tank production was essential to the German victory in World War I, the Kriegsamt did not significantly accelerate tank production and the developments of advanced offensive tactics were far more important.

Changes to the Army
Hindenburg and Ludendorff needed wide domestic changes to support their new approach to the handling of the German army. These changes came in the form of compulsory factory work for all able-bodied German workers from age 16 to 50. In addition to this, prisoners of war were subject to forced labor in German factories, which greatly increased production throughout early 1917. These new workers were put to work producing weapons, ammunition, and armored vehicles. By the time the Summer Offensive began in May 1917, about 1300 light tanks and 600 heavy tanks had been produced as a result of the Hindenburg Program. Along with increased production, the program demanded large increases in frontline manpower to operate the new equipment and discourage enemy offensives on the western front. By 1917, nearly 22 divisions had been added to the German army and about 900,000 men in total, giving the Germans slight numerical superiority on the western front by April 1917.