1965 Assessment on the Far East (PJW)

The 1965 Assessment on the Far East was a memo from National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger to President Richard Nixon on the state of several countries in East Asia, written in December 1965.

Assessment
VIETNAM: The situation in Vietnam is the most volatile and the one our attention must be given to first. The South Vietnamese regime has seen several generals and juntas fall in-and-out of power; the current ruler is Nguyen Van Thieu, Chairman of the National Leadership Committee. It is important we legitimize and stabilize Thieu's rule as quickly as possible. The current situation in the war is a stalemate; the previous year's offensive by North Vietnam ended inconclusively, and we believe they will not be able to mount another large scale offensive for, at the minimum, two years. Their funding, supplying, and training for the guerrillas in the south will no doubt continue, so our first operations there should be focused on anti-insurgency, rather than military offensives into the north.

As for our foreign allies, they are attempting to leave the situation they've been bogged down in for the past several years. The French have already left, and Prime Ministers Richard Crossman and Lester B. Pearson have made promises to withdraw. The Nordic Council has not been seriously involved in Vietnam operations, but their continuing presence in Thailand makes them a valuable asset.

My recommendation is a gradual build up of our military presence in the region. For Thieu to be successfully installed as leader of South Vietnam, he must have a solid base. Training and supplying his own troops, rather than him simply relying on ours, will be important for the future. The Oslo Pact made the mistake of allowing Diem to rely on their troops, with less than satisfactory results.

Note that CAMBODIA and LAOS are included in this assessment of Vietnam. Our policy should be the same there as those two countries are already embroiled in the war; Cambodia's United Issarak Front and Laos's Pathet Lao receive their orders from Hanoi.

KOREA: The previous year, Korea had cut off all contact with the outside world, only maintaining a small point of contact in the port of Pusan and in the DMZ. While reports from there are limited, we know that Lee Chu-il is embarking on a massive industrialization program for the country. It's known through propaganda films released from South Korea that Chu-il detests communism and the Soviets as much as he detests the United States, so his presence, for the time being, is acceptable to prevent the spread of communism towards Japan.

Should we feel the need to remove Chu-il, which I suggest might be necessary, it should be done after the conflict in Vietnam is settled. An army of exiled Koreans is currently serving in Vietnam; a new leader to install in South Korea can be found there.

MALAYSIA: The British have tentative plans for Malaysian independence, dated for June 1966, but a second uprising by Malayan communists has clouded the situation. Since their defeat in 1960, the Malayan National Liberation Army retreated into hiding in Thailand. It is believed they needed two more years before they could launch a second uprising into Malaysia, but Nordic-ordered crackdowns on communism in Thailand appears to have caused them to accelerate their plans. Intelligence reports indicate the rebellion in under-supplied and will likely be stamped out by the end of 1966. Still, we should send in a few advisers; it is necessary to have good relations with a newly-independent Malaysian state due to their neighbor to the south.

INDONESIA: President Sukarno's current plans for the future of Indonesia are unknown at the moment. In the recent years he has made himself a champion for anti-imperialism in southeast Asia, and has moved his country significantly to the left in doing so. We do know these left leanings have angered some of the military, suggesting that if Sukarno decided to, in anyway, support communism in an independent Malaysia, the military would refuse. We must find out which military leaders oppose Sukarno, and see if they are willing to overthrow him; while there is no need for a regime change at the moment, we should be prepared for one in the future as we escalate our presence in the region.

CHINA: Mao Zedong's industrialization and modernization programs have been failures. Given his nature to throw bodies at problems, we're unsure if further violence will be used to bring the nation to his standards. We do know that he is losing his standing within Chinese national politics; perhaps he - or his successor - will be open to a re-entry of relations. Having relations with China could prevent any escalation of the conflict in Vietnam as happened in Korea, though their lack of action during the Oslo Pact's overseeing of the war suggests otherwise. Can't be too careful, however.