Hungarian invasion of Czechoslovakia (WFAC)

The Hungarian campaign in Czechoslovakia, codenamed Operation Csaba (Hungarian: Csaba hadművelet) was a military operation carried out by the Kingdom of Hungary against the Republic of Czechoslovakia between October 20, 1938 and March 15, 1939. The operation marked the entrance of Hungary in what would later be known as the Second World War.

Treaty of Trianon
Of the countries bordering the ČSR, Hungary had particular interests in parts of their territory. For years they had wanted a revision of the Treaty of Trianon, which included the unification of the Hungarian-populated parts of the ČSR, if not the whole of Slovakia, with Hungary.

Initially, despite a move back towards nationalism, the new state under Regent Horthy agreed to ending the chance for further immediate conflicts and signed the Treaty of Trianon on June 4, 1920. Trianon reduced Hungary’s size substantially from its size in Austria-Hungary. Transylvania was taken by Romania; Slovakia became part of Czechoslovakia; Croatia, Slavonia, and Vojvodina joined the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Yugoslavia after 1929).

But the attitude of its neighbours decisively influenced Hungary's attitudes towards an action against the ČSR. The ČSR, Yugoslavia and Romania formed the "Little Entente" in 1920 and 1921, an alliance with the purpose of common defense against Hungarian irredentism and the prevention of a Habsburg restoration. France supported the alliance by signing treaties with each member country. Even in peacetime status the superiority of the Yugoslav army with 148,000 men in 16 divisions and the Romanian army with 225000 men in 24 divisions oppressive, although the Hungarian army in the summer of 1938 had achieved a peace strength of 85,000 men.

One could not exclude that an Hungarian aggression against ČSR would enable the contracts of the "Little Entente" and would lead the two countries into war against Hungary. Since 1937 Hungary had wished at least to reach the level of neutrality of Yugoslavia, for then to waiver of a border revision and thus be entitled to the Hungarian minorities living there. But for this Yugoslavia was not ready.

Movement to the right
In Hungary, the Great Depression induced a drop in the standard of living and the political mood of the country shifted further toward the right. In 1932, Regent Miklós Horthy appointed a new prime-minister, Gyula Gömbös, that changed the course of Hungarian policy towards closer cooperation with Germany and started an effort to assimilate the small minority population in Hungary, which totalled 5-7% of the population.[citation needed] Gömbös signed a trade agreement with Germany that led to the fast expansion of the economy, drawing Hungary out of the Great Depression, but made Hungary dependent on the German economy for both raw materials and markets.

Gömbös advocated a number of social reforms, a one-party government, a revision of the Treaty of Trianon, and Hungary's withdrawal from the League of Nations. Although he assembled a strong political machine, his efforts to achieve his vision and reforms were frustrated by a parliament composed mostly of István Bethlen's supporters and by Hungary's creditors, who forced Gömbös to follow conventional policies in dealing with the economic and financial crisis. The 1935 elections gave Gömbös more solid support in parliament. He succeeded in gaining control of the ministries of finance, industry, and defense and in replacing several key military officers with his supporters. In October 1936, he died from due to kidney problems without realizing this goal.

Hungary used its relationship with Germany to attempt revision of the Treaty of Trianon. In 1938, Hungary openly repudiated the treaty's restrictions on its armed forces. Adolf Hitler used promises of returning lost territories, and threats of military intervention and economic pressure to encourage the Hungarian Government into supporting the policies and goals of Nazi Germany.

Plans for military action against Czechoslovakia
The first contacts for joint operations against the ČSR arose during the visit of Göring to the Hungarian Regent Horthy and Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös de Jákfa in Budapest in June 1935. A few days later the Hungarian Chief of the General Staff, General Somkuthy, visited the German War Minister von Blomberg and the Chief of the Staff Ludwig Beck. Even then the continuation of the discussion between the interests of Hungary's revision of its neighbors and Germany's economic interests with the same states were clear. And so the Hungarians Blomberg recommended waiving revisions, only Hungary was an action against the ČSR. Amazingly the Hungarian General described Czechoslovakia, the most well-equipped and well-trained nation of the "Little Entente", as "our most vulnerable enemy." Despite intensive Hungarian wishes they came no closer to a agreement on German-Hungarian military cooperation. However the OKH included in the 1936 war games that Hungary would participate in an attack on ČSR with a strength of 12 brigades and two cavalry divisions.

In September 1937, War Minister v. Blomberg took up discussions with the Hungarian Minister of Defence during his visit of the German Autumn Manouevres about the prospects of their common war goals against ČSR. The following spring the Hungarian envoy v. Stojay said that these talks were "somewhat dull." Ribbentrop knew the intentions of Hitler and behaved cautiously. On March 31 the Hungarian envoy asked the the Foreign Office, when "the general staff meetings for possible joint actions" against the ČSR would begin. Although the Germans wanted not to be specific on the matter, Göring recommended in early June the Hungarian envoy for Hungary's early participation in a war between Germany and the ČSR. The chief of OKW Gen. D. Art Keitel, who visited Budapest on June 14, would clarify things further.

When the Chief of the Yugoslav General Staff in the spring of 1938 met with his with his Czechoslovak colleagues in Brno, the Hungarian Chief of General Staff v. Rácz saw this as proof of the effectiveness of the alliance between the two countries. And in early May, the heads of operational departments of the "Little Entente" gathered to discuss possible reactions against Hungary. The Yugoslavs did not wish to enter a conflict against Germany, because they expected that Italy would enter the war on the side of Germany. On August 23 a conference between the "Little Entente" and Hungary took place in the Yugoslav town of Bled. Here Hungary and the "Little Entente" (including the ČSR) aknowledged eachother's armed forces and renounced the use of armed force on the condition that the questions of each ethnic minorities would be satisfactorily resolved. Hungary were very demanding towards Czechoslovakia. The result of the conference in Bled had unsettled the German Foreign Office there. Such a stance would make Hungary neutralize against ČSR, and they meant that "a relaxation in favor of Czechoslovakia would be undesirable for us (Germany)."

At the same time the Hungarian Regent Admiral Miklós Horthy visited Berlin and Kiel. There were several partial parallel meetings. In an interview with Hitler Horthy presented the idea of "restoring the old Hungary in a big war in a few years with the help of German troops". Hitler was not interested, saying "that neither wishes nor claims (of Hungary)," and "whether it wants to participate (in the action against ČSR) or not lies with them." Finally Horthy concluded that Hungary would be prepared to intervene two weeks after a war had begun - provided by the unrealistic condition that the powers of the "Little Entente" were not active and prepared to intervene in the conflict on the side of Czechoslovakia.

However, despite the discussions between Horthy and Hitler, the Hungarian Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister remained cautious. They were unsure whether Yugoslavia would remain neutral in case of Hungarian aggression against Czechoslovakia, and they knew the Hungarian rearmament program needed at least a period of 1-2 years to prepare for war. Therefore the Hungarian General Staff returned to discussions over the military readiness and the military stockpiles of the armed forces. In meetings between the German and Hungarian ministers there was no clarity about the timing of a Hungarian intervention in a German-Czech conflict.

The talks requested by the General Staff were finally initiated on 6 September between the new Chief of the General Staff Halder and the Hungarian General Staff. Halder was doing at the express wish of Hitler no hints about the timing of the action. The attitude to win allies was strange, and the Hungarians were not better than Mussolini, who claimed they were not ready for a major European war. No wonder that Jodl already two days later noted that Hungary was "was at least in a good mood." In any event, the Hungarians were on the Reich Party Congress in "a angry mood, ...because the previous talks in Berlin had ended with no results."

When the Hungarian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister visited Hitler again on September 20, Hitler criticized Hungary for their "indecisive attitude." Two days later the British envoy to Hungary in Budapest warned against a military action. Even Ciano exhorted on September 26 Hungaryto show maximum restraint towards the ČSR, so that the Yugoslavs would not be obliged to abide by the agreements of the "Little Entente" to support Czechoslovakia.

But despite this, the Hungarians mobilised between 200,000 and 350,000 ill-trained and ill-equipped men on the Slovak and Ruthenian borders, ready to invade Czechoslovakia in case of war between Germany and Czechoslovakia. After Munich, the Hungarians had remained poised threateningly on the Slovak border. They reportedly had artillery ammunition for only 36 hours of operations, and were clearly engaged in a bluff, but it was a bluff the Germans had encouraged, and one that they would have been obliged to support militarily if the much larger, better trained and better equipped Czechoslovak Army chose to fight. The Czechoslovak army had built 2,000 small concrete emplacements along the border wherever there was no major river obstacle.

The Hungarians had in total mobilised 21 brigades. In the north of the country they had dispositioned the 1st Corps northwest of Budapest, the 2nd Corps northeast of Budapest and the 3rd Corps Moskolc in space. The 6th Corps, positioned around Debrecen, opposed Romania and the 5th Corps north of Szeged.

The Yugoslavs and Romanians announced their military intervention in case of a Hungarian attack on Czechoslovakia. The French military attaché in Bucharest assured the chief of the Romanian General Staff Div. Gen. Ştefan Gh Ionescu, that the powers of the Little Entente powers would intervene in case of a Hungarian attack on the ČSR. The Yugoslav army would in this case initiate an offensive on in a northerly direction towards Szeged with cooperation of the left wing of the Romanian Army, and then head to join the 3rd Czechoslovak army positioned in Slovakia. The Yugoslavs had in September 1938 a wartime strength of 1.2 million men and the Romanians a wartime strength of 1.5 million, which is both excessive values. Because of this threat in case of war, Hungary would intervene immediately or within 48 hours, perhaps even within 14 days.

However, another problem emerged: in case Hungary should join the Germans in the attack on Czechoslovakia, a casus belli would be needed as a pretext for a Hungarian declaration of war. This conclusion was made due to the fact that territorial claims alone might not be sufficient for an attack on Czechoslovakia. In September 1938 Leutenant Colonel Homlok of the Hungarian General Staff proposed to Colonel Helmuth Groscurth of the Abwehr, that german planes should drop Czech bombs on Hungarian territory, after some of the czech airfields have been captured, in order to create a false flag operation.

Details of the campaign
At dawn on October 20, 1938, Hungarian artillery suddenly opened fire on Czech defences along the Slovak-Hungarian border. While the Czechs had anticipated a Hungarian attack, the artillery bombardement still came as a complete surprise, especially for the Soviet soldiers of the 96th Rifle Division positioned in southern Slovakia. While the Hungarian shelled the Czech defences, the invading forces were given orders to "proceed as far as possible".

In the west, south of Bratislava, Brig. Gen. Bohuslav Všetička ordered his 15. divize “Jánošík” to position itself in the area in and around Bratislava, anticipating either a Hungarian or a joint German-Hungarian attack. In the south, the VII. sbor “Myslbek” and Hraniční pásmo XV ”Adam” prepared for combat, while the three reserve division of the III. armáda, including the 3. rychlá divize “David”, was mobilised and organised for combat. Further east the Hraniční pásmo XVI ”Ferdinand” was prepared to defend Eastern Slovakia and Ruthenia, along with some tanks.

The II Corps began ground operations soon after 8 o'clock in the morning, securing the bridges over the Danube River and the border stations without facing much resistance. After securing the border stations, Hungarian troops poured over the Hungarian-Czech frontier. The Hungarian troops advanced quickly towards Bratislava, which surprised both the Czechs and the Germans. Despite the awful confusion caused by the deteriorating situation, the Czech force in Bratislava had coalesced sufficiently to defend the city for a longer period of time. After several failed attempts to approach the city Maj.Gen. Milán Temessy decided to halt operations on November 1. However, at some places, the bridges were blown up by the Czechs, and thus prevented them from entering Czechoslovakia until a pontoon bridge had been built.

Further east the Hungarians were unable to cross the Danube, due to the border fortifications in the area. The I Corps attacked at 8:00 in the morning, following a short but precise artillery bombardement. When the Hungarians attempted to cross the river, they were immediately forced to fall back, due to the heavy resistance of Czech soldiers of the SOS (Stráž obrany státu) and border guards. The Hungarians continued to assault the Czech positions, but had not made any gains by November 1. Similarly the III Corps failed in gaining significant breakthroughs, and after several assault the Corps had still not crossed the border by November 1.

In the area south of Košice, the 13th Infantry Brigade initially made significant gains, having advanced 15 km into Czechoslovak territory. They had then reached the villages of Turňa nad Bodvou, Debraď, Paňovce, Šaca, Haniska, Gyňov and Trstené pri Hornáde. However, the advance was then blocked by the border forifications, and after several attempts to break through it, they halted operations temporarily on October 25.

Meanwhile, the III/13th Infantry Brigade formed the left flank of the spearhead advancing towards Michalovce, while the 3rd Huszar Regiment formed the right. After breaking through the border defences on October 23, they advanced around 15 km inland, but due to logistical limitations were forced to halt the advance in order to get the necessary supplies forward.

Together with the advance towards Bratislava, the largerst gains were made by the 14th Infantry Brigade advancing northwards through Ruthenia. They had by November 1 marched 30 km inland without facing any significant resistance, except for a couple of raids by Czech border guards and Slovak police units and air attacks by the Czechoslovak Air Force.

In the first 10 days of the Hungarian assault, the most fiercely contested action was in the air, and continued after the Hungarian ground advance had halted. The Zemské velitelství letectva Slovensko, under the command of Colonel Jaroslav Skála, was responsible for defending the airspace over Slovakia. Opposing them was the majority of the Hungarian Air Force - the 1st and 2nd Fighter Regiments, the 3rd Bomber Regiment and the 1stIndependent Long-Range Reconnaissance Group.

On the morning of the Hungarian attack, October 20, three Letov Š-328 army cooperation aircraft spotted the Hungarian concentrations south of the border and the Hungarians' advance into Ruthenia. In the early afternoon three more Letovs, equipped with bombs and escorted by five Avia B-534s, set out to attack the Hungarian columns south of Bratislava. The bombing raid was partially successful, but on their way back they were hit by well-directed Hungarian anti-aircraft fire, which downed a B-534 and damaged a Letov. At 1500 three more B-534s strafed a column of Hungarian armour and trucks advancing into Ruthenia, followed by 2 Letovs which dropped bombs on the column. However, another B-534 was lost.

Meanwhile, eighteen Junkers Ju-86K-2 bombers from Debrecen, escorted by nine CR.32 fighters set out to raid Košice. Ten of the bombers found their target at 12:30 and then dropped their bombs over the main railway station there, killing 24 civilians. Bratislava was not targeted by Hungarian bombers, but the city had already been bombed by the Luftwaffe in the first two weeks of the war.

At dawn on October 22, eight B-534s took off from the Air Force station at Spišská Nová Ves on another ground attack mission, but they were intercepted over Kráľovský Chlumec by nine Hungarian Fiat CR.32. One B-534 was shot down and two others crash landed. The pilot of one later that day captured by the Hungarians. A few hours later, three more Letovs bombed the Hungarians around Berehovo. One was damaged by ground fire, but managed to escape. A final air battle took place in the afternoon. Three Letovs, escorted by three B-534s were intercepted by nine CR.32 shortly after delivering their bombs on the forward elements of the 14th Infantry Brigade. One Letov was downed, but the B-534s managed to ensure the escape of the others, shooting down three CR.32s and losing two B-534s in the process. On October 27, a group of Letov bombers escorted by five Avia B-534s attacked again attacked the 14th Infantry Brigade, this time losing no aircrafts to anti-aircraft fire or to enemy fighters.

On October 23 the eighteen Junkers Ju-86K-2 bombers set out to raid Spišská Nová Ves, which the captured Czech pilot had let slip was the main Czech Air Base in eastern Slovakia. Nine of the bombers found their target at 14:10, and destroyed or damaged three Avia B-534s, three Aero AP-32s and two Letov Š-328s on the ground. Although the airfield was still usable, the air raid had killed 13 persons, which resulted with an intense anti-Hungarian movement that arose among the local population.

After 73 civilians had been killed due to Hungarian air raids and artillery shellings, the anti-Hungarian movement that arose among the local population changed the policy of the Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana) led by Monsignor Jozef Tiso. Instead of fighting against the Czechs, he now agreed (temporarily) to support the Czech government with fighting the invading Germans and Hungarians, and ordered the Hlinka Guard (Hlinkova garda) to fight the Hungarians whenever possible and to support the Czech troops already stationed in Slovakia.

During the crisis caused by Hitler's demand for the Sudetenland (in the summer of 1938), the Hlinka Guard emerged spontaneously, and on October 8 of that year, a week after war had broken out between Germany and Czechoslovakia, the guard was officially set up, with Karol Sidor as its first commander.

While hardliners within the party was reluctant to fight along the Czechs, their trust for the Czechs after their decision to fight the invaders had risen, and many were actually supportive to fight along with the Czechs against the hated Hungarians.