1274 - 1200 BC (Of Kings and Gods)

Egyptian-Hittite War (1274-1269)

 * See main article — Battle of Qadesh

Following the stunning Hittite victory at Qadesh, the Hittites turned from defense to offense, marching south into Egyptian territory. With Ramesses dead, the remaining Egyptians had to retreat, being harassed by the Hittite chariot force all the while. The bulk of the Hittite army, led by their king Muwatalli II, marched south along the Egyptian controlled Canaanite coast. Khaemweset, the last surviving Egyptian commander could do nothing to stop the advance, and was instead forced inland as a desperate move to avoid premature clash with the Hittites. But despite their predicament, the Egyptians had two advantages; they were in their home territory, and their smaller army could reach the densely populated central Canaan faster. With no other options, Khaemweset began a race with Muwatalli to the heartland of Canaan, the first wanting to recruit troops to defend his home, the later bent on conquest. Unsurprisingly, Khaemweset arrived first, giving him some footing to defend himself. Before the Hittites arrived, he had a short window he used to increase the size of his numerically inferior army, and begin to fortify central Canaan. The densely populated and mountainous region proved easy to defend, and by the time the Hittites arrived within striking range, Khaemweset's force was spread in forts across the region. Muwatalli, while bent on conquest, was no fool and didn’t see a future in attacking the fortresses head on. But Khaemweset was only able to fortify so much of the region, so the Hittites had options. Muwatalli put the Egyptians under siege, but sent the bulk of his force to pillage Canaan. Unwilling to abandon their fortresses, the Egyptians had to let the Hittites tear across the region with little resistance. Taking advantage of this, Muwatalli began to spread propaganda against the seemingly impotent Egyptians, often sparing villages if they swore loyalty to the Hittites. As an attempt to mount a credible defense, Khaemweset began to work to reassemble the Egyptian chariot force. And indeed, Muwatalli's attack could only continue for so long without at least some Egyptian intervention, and in early 1273 Khaemweset obliged with his chariots, keeping his foot soldiers in his forts. After almost half a year of preparation, the Egyptian chariots were again prepared for combat. This posed an interesting problem for both sides. The Hittite chariots generally carried three men, while the Egyptians settled for two apiece. This made the Egyptian chariots more maneuverable and more effective against Hittite chariots, but not as effective against opposing infantry. Complicating the picture further, Egyptian chariots performed even worse when faced with infantry supported by chariots. It would be completely fair to see the Egyptians at a disadvantage, but Khaemweset was a brilliant tactician and saw the value of his more maneuverable units. Also working to their advantage was the Hittite chariot commander Hattusili III, who expected an easy fight and was largely unprepared for actual combat. Superior strategy and an unprepared opponent let the Egyptian chariots take the battlefield by storm in early 1273 and well into the year. In only a few months, the Egyptians had gone from sitting ducks rapidly losing control of Canaan to a credible threat to the Hittites. In several notable battles, the Egyptian chariots beat back the Hittites with only minor losses. But as the summer dragged on, it quickly became apparent that the Egyptians couldn't maintain their chariot force. Not only were they numerically inferior to the Hittites, but it was nearly impossible for them to actually control territory; they simply had to try to force the Hittites back whenever they tried to advance. In short they made a nuisance of themselves (even killing Hattusili), but by no means a nuisance able to force back the Hittites or even tip the balance of the war. So as 1273 started to end and chariot casualties started to mount, Khaemweset had to reassess his strategy. The Egyptians would have to either leave their forts to fight, or leave Canaan to fall. Khaemweset's conclusion was practically forced. If he didn't pull his army out of their fortresses he would lose Canaan. So as 1273 wound to a close, the army started to pull out of its fortifications and confront the Hittites in the field. Muwatalli wasn’t expecting to have to fight the full brunt of the Egyptian army, so his forces quickly folded at their weak points. Khaemweset exploited these weaknesses brutally and efficiently throwing the entire region into chaos. But the chaos quickly became impossible to manage, and the two armies lost all cohesion. Fighting was still widespread and on vast scales, but neither side had any meaningful central command. It soon became impossible for either side to make significant gains. If not fully entrenched per se, both sides were too thinly spread and confused for the situation to change. This chaos continued well into 1272, but by that time both sides were able to make noticeable strides towards organization. This chaos did advance one agenda though - Muwatalli's attempts to turn the Canaanites on Egypt. The maelstrom that had engulfed Canaan had done little for its residents, and it was all too easy for the Hittites to paint the Egyptians as incompetent and oppressive overlords. So while both sides bled out on the battlefield, the prevailing sentiment started to shift dramatically against the Egyptians. The fact that the period of absolute chaos was ending did nothing for this - in fact, Khaemwest's consolidation seemed more like a retreat than anything to the locals. To make matters worse, it seemed as though the Egyptians had "lost" the period of chaos, as much as neither side really could. So as Khaemweset brought his troops back into a coherent formation, he found himself fighting against not only the Hittites, but also the increasingly rebellious Canaanites. As soon as 1271 arrived, it was clear the Egyptians were being crushed. Fighting the Hittites effectively had become nearly impossible with the rebellion in Canaan rapidly growing. The Hittites had their own problems though - with the Canaanites fighting the Egyptians, they could hardly go back to raiding the countryside. Without the revenue from loot, the war quickly became a massive liability for Hatti. This meant the Hittites quickly became less of a force in the war for Canaan. Muwatalli was only able to launch periodic attacks against the Egyptians, and Khaemweset was preoccupied with the far more aggressive Canaanites. Throughout late 1271 and 1270, clash between the Hittites and Egyptians was minimal. By 1269 major fighting between the two had effectively ceased. With Qadesh and some of northern Canaan secured, Muwatalli saw nothing left to gain and finally disbanded his army, leaving the Canaanites alone to fight the Egyptians.

Canaanite Rebellion (1271-1262)
In the wake of the chaos had rocked Canaan for years on end, the Canaanites started to embrace the Hittites and began to turn on the Egyptians. Muwatalli had no problem incorporating this new force into his army, and as his own assets began to waver the Canaanites started to become a more serious problem for Khaemweset than the Hittites. The Egyptians were soon faced with an assault from all sides by their former subjects. With this new army in the theater, combat between the Hittites and Egyptians slowly began to cease. No longer able to fund their expensive campaign in Canaan, the Hittites started to withdraw in 1270. By 1269 the Hittites had abandoned most of Canaan, only keeping the regions near Qadesh. This didn’t improve Khaemweset’s position at all. Instead, the Canaanite rebels started to transition into full scale war with the Egyptians, who were in no position to immediately counter them or even challenge the Hittites in the north. Khaemweset found his army cornered in central Canaan, surrounded by hostile armies. However, the Pharaoh wouldn't have to deal with that for long - in 1268 he died and was soon replaced by Na-Thon (See section below, Dynastic Transition)

The transition of power made no difference in the fighting. Na-Thon was unable to travel to the combat, so Khaemweset was simply replaced by his various underlings. The only practical difference this made was split the Egyptian army into smaller units; a move that arguably made it more effective because the smaller units were able to maneuver more effectively against the small Canaanite armies. However, this new dynamic did little to change the course of the fighting. The Egyptians were still trapped in a rebellious territory, with no fortifications or easy way out. To make matters worse, the Egyptian chariot force was almost entirely extinguished by this point, leaving them with no real counter to the Canaanites massive advantages. But even with all these problems the Egyptians still fielded a credible army, and they were deep in their opponent’s core territory. So throughout 1267 and 1266 the two sides clashed across Canaan, the Egyptians razing cities but taking huge casualties in the process.

Wanting to secure his reign and the rebellious territory, Na-thon decided to raise three armies to right through Canaan. The first was to be commanded by his brother Caial, the other two by established Egyptian generals. Nominally, all three would take orders from Na-thon himself, but the Pharaoh never planned on leaving Memphis. With most of Egypt's professional and semi-professional soldiers sent to Qadesh nearly a decade ago, the nation had a hard time raising anything substantial. But over the year 1266, a force of mostly infantry was raised, mostly recruited from Egypt's workforce and farmers, and manged by low level nobles and what few units had remained in Egypt during the clash with the Hittites. Unsurprisingly, this strained the empire's economy, but Na-thon was determined to recover Canaan. and so in 1267, the three armies, all but barren of anything but infantry, began their march into southern Canaan, while the existing Egyptian units moved south to meet them.

The Egyptians were met with brutal Canaanite resistance. The remaining veterans of Qadesh were able to join the army commanded by Caial, but soon found themselves under attack. Before they could even start their planned takeover of the southern most Canaanite cities, they took heavy causalities to Canaanite raids without much chance for retaliation. The final attacks on cities didn't go any better. Caial had apparently chosen to attack a lightly fortified city called Uru-Gela, hoping to force a pitched battle. But the Canaanites were more than prepared for a siege, and forced the Egyptians to break into the city and effectively raze the entire area in the months long process of taking it. Not only did this do little to further Egypt's goals, it further emboldened Canaanite restrained, making it that much harder to fight. Similar fates befell the other two Egyptian armies - in fact, one of them was effectively destroyed by the end of 1266.

In the coming years, the war would follow the footprint of the first few battles. The Egyptians would take brutal losses until they seized a city, only to make the Canaanite resistance stronger, and then repeat the process with the surviving Canaanite defenders and their comrades at the next city. To make matters worse, the Egyptian armies couldn't realistically hold more a small area at once, and were often forced to shore up their defenses, or even fight the same battles to reclaim areas they had lost. As a final nail in the coffin, Egyptian forces could never advance far north at all, leaving most of Canaan to its own devices, to the joy of its citizens. In 1263, Caial committed suicide, putting even more of a damper on Egyptian efforts. While he was soon replaced, much of his army deserted in the interim. The Egyptians forces were dulled even further by Caial's replacement - the name is lost to history, but he was a terrible general by all accounts.

Meanwhile, as Egypt continued to make no progress in the south of Canaan, the more northern regions were doing rather well for themselves. ??? (REPLACES AQUELCI, REDO RELEVANT PAGES), who would eventually become the first king of Canaan, was already beginning to make a reputation for himself, helping to organize the defense of Canaan. Notably, he began to receive help from the Hittites, who apparently lent him weapons and generals to use. The rest of Canaan began to prosper, at least compared to an Egypt that was crippled by it's massive expenditures in Canaan. As the war continued to wear on, the Egyptians realized the futility of it, and in 1263 began to ask for peace. Fighting began to die down, and the Egyptians began to slowly loosen up, retreating from their captured cities - both as a sign of goodwill, and because they simply couldn't afford the occupation. Finally, in 1262, Canaan was allowed to go free, though its exact borders would remain unclear for centuries.

Dynastic Transition (1268)
Following Khaemweset's death fighting in Canaan, a new Pharaoh had to be found to take the reigns. At the time, the fighting in Canaan was seen as no immediate threat, so it wasn’t seen as essential to find a new Pharaoh immediately. In addition, after the death of Khaemweset, there was no one immediately apparent to replace him. As a result, much of the noble family as well as the more powerful Nomarchs seemed in good position to ascend to the throne. Among the most notable candidates, there was Na-Thon, an well known ambitious Nomarch who was accused of having Khaemweset assassinated, but with a few powerful allies. There was also Kelamweset, Ramses, and Merneptah, a trio of brothers led by Kelamweset, all Nomarchs. While there were certainly other contenders, the clash between Na-Thon and the trio is the best recorded, both by scribes at the time and by Na-Thon’s eventual biography.

Most sources agree that Na-Thon’s opening moves were fairly brutal — while the accusations about having Khaemweset killed are controversial, the fact that he offed at least few minor competitors is not. After that, his main goal was to pay off Meryatum, the most senior general left in Egypt and commander of most of the troops in Pi-Ramesses, the capital of Egypt. Meryatum, a general ready to retire with no realistic claim to the throne, was more than happy to align himself with Na-Thon, and even more happy to avoid open conflict with him. The only downside for Na-Thon was the expense - he apparently had to sell off land in the south to pay, but the deal was done regardless. So early in 1268 Na-Thon moved to Pi-Ramesses, seemingly already in position to claim their throne. It appeared as all that was left for him to do was shore up support from the nobles and he’d be Pharaoh.

Of course, the trio of brothers had other ideas. While they had gotten off to a slower start than their chief competitors, they had far more existing resources and allies, mostly based in the city of Memphis. Worried about Na-Thon’s rapid ascension, Kelamweset sent his youngest brother Merneptah to Pi-Ramesses to keep track of the situation, and pay off Meryatum - not enough to turn on Na-Thon, but enough to keep him from making any moves directly against the trio. Aware that the bribe probably wouldn’t be enough to stop Meryatum, Kelamweset and Ramses began to raise an army of their own. Lead by an old ally of their family called Henutweset, the army was mostly composed of semi-professional units from around Memphis. As word spread of the sizable fore raised by the three brothers, they attracted a fair amount of support, especially from upper Egypt and Heliopolis. Suddenly in a much better position, Kelamweset began to march towards Pi-Ramesses to challenge Na-Thon.

Even before Kelamweset began to come to Pi-Ramesses, things had deteriorated for Na-Thon. He had discovered that Meryatum had been bribed (though not who he had been bribed by), and had him promptly killed. Now, the soldiers were now being paid directly by Na-Thon, and under the command of a much less expirenced general. Not only had the effectiveness of his force been substantially reduced, but he was now slowly going broke. Another challenge had come in the form of Ramelfre - a distant relative of Khaemweset who had mounted a weak claim to the throne. Although he had quickly lost support, he had shaken Na-Thon’s support. As his position deteriorated, the once heir-apparent was having trouble attracting additional support, and his remaining allies had to be carefully managed. By the time the brothers began to march their army to Pi-Ramesses, it looked very much like Na-Thon’s bid at the throne was teetering on the brink.

Now pressured on all sides, Na-Thon made an explosive but calculated move. With Kelamweset advancing leisurely northwards, confident Na-Thon would surrender, Na-Thon immediately killed Merneptah and several other nobles who weren’t loyal to him. Now rapt in terror, the remaining nobles swore loyalty to him. Had the situation been less confused, Na-Thon likely would have been met with sharper resistance, but upending the entire power dynamic was able to buy him some time. He sent envoys to the other power players in Egypt - Kelamweset included - and announced the death of Merneptah, and formally declared himself Pharaoh, though he had yet to be corenated by any priests. Kelamweset and Ramses, now enraged, gathered their army and picked up the pace to Pi-Ramesses, hoping to dethrone Na-Thon while the situation was still confused enough for the tide to turn in their favor.

Still moving fast, Na-Thon moved his army south of Pi-Ramesses to confront Kelamweset. The advancing army wasn't prepared for an armed confrontation, was subsequently completely shocked and stopped short of the city, where they waited nervously. What happens next is recorded in two distinct ways - the version shown at Na-Thon’s tomb has Na-Thon riding to the opposing army on a chariot and accepting a surrender from Ramses while his brother fled. The more likely version is that Na-Thon simply ordered his army to advance, and the less experienced opposing army crumpled around the two brothers. In either case, Ramses surrendered and was promptly imprisoned, while Kelamweset fled south. With his enemies dispatched, Na-Thon officially became Pharaoh of Egypt, taking control of the struggling kingdom and returning his attention to the war in Canaan. Kelamweset was never found, but it seems to be likely he died shortly after the confrontation near Pi-Ramesses.

Twentieth Dynasty

 * See main article — Twentieth Dynasty of Egypt

Na-Thon (1268-1262)

 * See main article — Na-Thon

Following his Machiavellian ascent to the throne, Na-Thon was generally seen as untrustworthy and desperately needed to bring both the people of Egypt and the nobles into his fold. Obviously, the first step was to claim himself as the logical successor to Khaemweset, though most mark Na-Thon's reign as the beginning of the twentieth dynasty, mostly because there is no obvious relation between the two. Still fearing a coup or other assault on his rule, the new emperor embarked on a campaign to buy himself popularity. After further machinations to buy himself loyalty from the nobles, the obvious first step was to raise more armies to join the stagnating war in Canaan. Na-Thon use a general named Caial and two of his lieutenants to raise three armies to fight in Canaan, mostly from the Nile delta region. By the end of 1268, the armies would be assembled and on their way to fight the Canaanite rebels, serving as an amazing propaganda device all the while.

In fact, propaganda was probably the main purpose of the army in the first place. Outside of that, it seemed Na-Thon had a fairly limited interest in Canaan. And it was hugely effective - after the army had departed to Canaan, most of the nobles started to pivot towards Na-Thon, and the Pharaoh seemed popular with the citizens. All that was left to bring Egypt completely under his control were a series of purges that were carried out quietly through the end of 1267. With Egypt under his thumb, Na-Thon started an expensive campaign of state sponsored festivities to buy the loyalty of his people. Throughout his reign Na-Thon would often sponsor chariot racing, wrestling, or other sporting events in major cities, at huge cost to himself or Egypt, and often both. Despite the loyalty these investments bought him, by 1264 Egypt’s treasury was starting to run dry, with Na-Thon’s personal fortune long gone. Not only was this harmful to the broader Egyptian economy, but it meant Na-Thon’s former rivals started to once again turn on him.

But even as Egypt started to break at the seams, Na-Thon managed to keep things together for a few years. But the end was inevitable, and in 1262, it was clear to all Egypt was out of money, and Na-Thon was out of ways to help. Within weeks, the already stagnating war in Canaan ground to a halt. The government spending that had always driven the Egyptian economy dried up as well, effectively throwing the nation into economic collapse. Inevitably, this led to what amounted to open revolt from Na-Thon’s allies, and instability across Egypt. As the Egyptian army ceased fighting and fled back to their homeland, Na-Thon was forced to surrender Canaan to the rebels. The nobles didn’t need anything more than that to start their coup. Led by Na-Thon’s distant relative Suamweset, a group of nobles had the defenseless Pharaoh assassinated, and put Suamweset on the throne to deal with the disaster Na-Thon left behind.

Suamweset (1262-1247)
Unlike his predecessor, no one challenged Suamweset to the throne. As a Nomarch, he had already proven himself a capable leader, and had been vital in orchestrating the plot to take down Na-Thon. His relation to the dead Pharaoh helped to - even in the case of a disgraced Pharaoh, it was considered preferable to elevate a relative to replace him if possible. With the throne easily secured, Suamweset set to work eliminating the last of Na-Thon's influence from Egypt. The most obvious course of action was to purge the Nomarchs and other officials that had been loyal to Na-Thon up to the end. This was done quickly and efficiently, and within months, Egypt's bureaucracy had undergone a complete paradigm shift away from the former Pharaoh. Most of Na-Thon's other projects were also eliminated - his festivals, sports contests, and even the grain dole he had briefly introduced in Memphis. With the exception of the capital remaining in Memphis (Which was also Suamweset's home city), Na-Thon's influence was all but deleted from Egypt.

But as Suamweset consolidated his power, a problem remained - Egypt's government remained completely broke and its economy was in shambles, and the citizens weren't happy. Meanwhile, Egypt’s army remained ravaged from decades of intense combat. The nearly irreplaceable chariot corps was reduced to a shell of itself, so all that really remained was infantry. Obviously this effect was only amplified by Suamweset’s economic problem - without funds, the army couldn’t be improved. This combination proved very condusive to rebellion. Though not wide spread at first, by 1259, there was definite signs of scattered rebellion, mostly near Luxor and Pi-Ramesses. Had the rebellions taken place under Na-Thon, they probably would have been propped up by nobles but as Egypt stood, they didn’t need the help. Suamweset’s reign was complexity unequipped to deal with any real challenge.

But to be fair to Suamweset, the rebellions were hardly the worst of his problems. Economic struggles were starting to affect the annual harvest, which could easily tip Egypt over the edge if it wasn’t carefully managed. So rebellion festered in Egypt, mostly manifesting in raids against goverment grain stores and other plots that mostly amounted to petty theft, with Suamweset taking only minor action to stop it. But even petty theft was enough to throw Egypt off balance at this point. As Suamweset tried to reinvigorate Egypt’s harvests, he had to ignore the civil disobedience, which obviously made it worse. By 1257, while no real rebel figurehead had emerged, but the rebellion started to become a serious proposition, demanding attention. Grudgingly, Suamweset began to start to engage the rebels, having what little remained of Egypt’s army patrol places that were often the victims of raids, and executing known dissenters.

This move would turn out to be a complete failure for Suamweset. For one it made it impossible to properally manage Egypt’s agriculture. With the nation’s bureaucracy gutted by both Na-Thon’s reign and the economic trouble, the Pharaoh couldn’t be fighting rebels while also managing the agriculture. Furthermore, the clamp down also inspired more extremists to join the ranks of the rebels, turning them from a severe nuisance to a legitimate threat. Soon the two sides were in what almost amounted to a civil war - the only upside for Suamweset was that the serious fighting was mostly contained to Luxor, Thebes, and to a lesser degree the rest of upper Egypt, with pockets of resistance in Pi-Ramesses. Despite his army’s weakness, Suamweset was usually able to decisively defeat the rebellions. The real problem was the large destruction and mismanagement of crops that only got worse as the fighting wore on.

As the rebellion started to fall apart in 1255 - the disorganization and lack of any real goal had ensured it’s quick downfall - Egypt seemed worse off than it had before. Despite the victory, during the summer it seemed as if Egypt’s agricultural base was in shambles - and during the harvest, this was confirmed. Egypt was entering a rare famine. Egypt was less prepared for a famine than most nations - the consistency of the Nile and Egypt’s bureaucracy meant harvests were almost always successful, so they were entirely unprepared for a famine. Not only was the harvest smaller than usual, but transportation to centers of population was also difficult. The fighting had deteriorated Egypt’s infrastructure, and without the funds or institutional wherewithal to fix it, Suamweset was stuck with a massively inefficient system.

/unrest, Suamweset dies and Tutemef takes the throne