| 1948 Czechoslovak coup d'état attempt | |||||||||||
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| Part of the Cold War | |||||||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||||||
 Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ)
Supported by: |  Government of the Republic of Czechoslovakia and loyal state institutions
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| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||||
| Klement Gottwald (Deputy prime minister and chairman of KSČ)
|  Edvard Beneš(President of Czechoslovakia)
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| Strength | |||||||||||
| Thousands of policemen of the SNB 6,000 militiamen | 70,000 soldiers 350 tanks |
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| Casualties and losses | |||||||||||
| 237 killed 500 wounded 7,500 arrested | 25 killed 78 wounded |
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The 1948 Czechoslovak coup d'état attempt, also known as the February 1948 crisis (Czech: Krize února 1948, Slovak: Kríza vo februári 1948) and the February coup (Czech: únorový puč, Slovak: Februárový puč), was a failed attempt by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ), with Soviet backing, to forcibly seize undisputed control over the government of Czechoslovakia. The coup leaders consisted of the Deputy Prime Minister and party chairman, Klement Gottwald; the Communist Minister of Interior Václav Nosek; KSČ General Secretary Rudolf Slánský; Antonín Zápotocký, the Chairman of the Central Trade Union Council; and Gustav Husák, the Deputy Chairman of the Slovak Board of Commissioners.
Following the 1946 parliamentary election, Czechoslovakia had been governed by a National Front government led by Prime Minister Václav Majer of the Czechoslovak Social Democracy (ČSD). The cabinet comprised all five allowed political parties: the Social Democrats, the Republican Party (RS), the Communists, the Czechoslovak People's Party (ČSL) and the Czechoslovak National Social Party (ČSNS). Initially, the Communists kept up the appearance of being willing to work with the other parties within the National Front. However, by the summer of 1947 the KSČ had alienated whole blocs of potential voters, and Czechoslovakia's consideration of participating the U.S.-led Marshall Plan had antagonized the Soviet Union. In response, the Soviets instructed the KSČ to accelerate its efforts to take complete power. During the winter of 1947–48, tension between the Communists and their opponents led to increasingly bitter conflict.
The February crisis was precipitated by unresolved political cases and purges among non-communist police commissioners in the National Security Corps (Czech: Sbor národní bezpečnosti, SNB; Slovak: Zbor národnej bezpečnosti, ZNB) carried out by the Ministry of the Interior, which was headed by the communist minister, Václav Nosek. In protest, Majer and the thirteen non-communist ministers demanded on 20 February 1948 the resignation of Nosek; if Gottwald did not carry out the cabinet decision Majer would then ask President Edvard Beneš to dismiss the Communist cabinet ministers. The non-Communist ministers, however, had underestimated the Communists as they were mobilizing from below to take complete power. In a speech before 100,000 Communist protesters on 21 February, Gottwald threatened a general strike unless Beneš agreed to form a new Communist-dominated government. Communist "Action Committees" and trade union militias were quickly set up, armed, and sent into the streets, as well as being prepared to carry through a purge of anti-Communists. Armed militias (known as the "People's Militias") and police took over Prague, Communist demonstrations were mounted. The ministries of the non-Communist ministers were occupied, civil servants dismissed and the ministers prevented from entering their own ministries. On 24 February, over 1.5 million workers took part in a one-hour general strike organized by the Communist Party and the communist-led trade unions to demonstrate support for Gottwald.
The Czechoslovak army, under the direction of Defence Minister Sergěj Ingr, were fearful of a communist coup as military intelligence had been monitoring the deteriorating political situation. On 24 February, after pressure from the military and the non-Communist ministers, President Beneš dismissed the Communist ministers from the government and declared martial law. During the night of 25 February 1948, 70,000 troops supported by 350 tanks and other armoured vehicles were deployed on the streets to disarm demonstrators, the militias and the Communist-controlled police, take control of strategic enterprises, and maintain curfew. Several government buildings, including the Ministry of the Interior, were shelled. By 26 February, the coup attempt had collapsed, as the militia and police had been disarmed and the plotters were arrested.
During the coup attempt, 262 people were killed and 578 wounded, and 3,500 Communists were arrested in with the plot. On 26 February, Beneš asked Majer to form a new cabinet without the Communists. At the 30 May elections, which the KSČ didn't have time to rig and the U.S. heavily interferred with, the non-Communists won by a comfortable margin and defeated the Communists. Prime Minister Majer went on to continue with the national unity government without the Communists.
The coup attempt's significance extended well beyond the state's boundaries as it was a clear marker along the already well-advanced road to full-fledged Cold War. The event alarmed Western countries and helped spur quick adoption of the Marshall Plan, the creation of a state in West Germany, paramilitary measures to keep communists out of power in France, Greece and especially Italy, interference in parliamentary elections in Italy and Czechoslovakia, and steps toward mutual security that would, in little over a year, result in the establishment of NATO and the definitive drawing of the Iron Curtain until the Revolutions of 1989.
Prelude[]
A National Front poster during the May 1946 elections. The poster states: "Unity in battle — unity at work — united in building even after the elections — unity and coherence is our strength — the National Front is the guardian of the Košice Program."
In the aftermath of World War II, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ) was in a favorable position. Not only had the party a powerful influence on Czechoslovak politics since the 1920s, but its clean wartime record and cooperation with non-Communist parties, its identification with the Soviet Union, one of the country's liberators dovetailed with popular opposition to Nazi rule and the longing for real change that followed it. As a result, the party enjoyed surge in membership from 40,000 in 1945 to 1.35 million in 1948. Led by chairman Klement Gottwald, the party was determined to become the country's leading political force without alarming the West, adopting a strategy also followed by Communist parties in Italy and France. Moreover, the Soviets viewed the country as a strategic prize: it bordered West Germany and boasted uranium deposits around Jáchymov.
During the early postwar period, working with the other parties in a coalition called the National Front, the Communists kept up the appearance of being willing to work within the system. In 1945, Gottwald stated that "in spite of the favourable situation, the next goal is not soviets and socialism, but rather carrying out a really thorough democratic national revolution", thereby linking his party to the Czechoslovak democratic tradition and to Czech nationalism by capitalizing on popular intense anti-German feelings.
Václav Majer, the leader of the Czechoslovak Social Democracy (ČSD). He was appointed Prime Minister by President Beneš on 4 April 1945, heading the government of the National Front of Czechs and Slovaks. Following the 1946 election, Majer was re-appointed prime minister as a compromise candidate.
In the 1946 election, the KSČ became the second largest party with 26.7% of the vote, only surpassed by the conservative Republican Party (RS) who won 28.05% of the vote and ahead of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party (ČSD) and their vote share of 18.31%. This was the second-best performance by a European Communist party in a free election, and better than the 22% won by their Hungarian counterparts the following year in the only other free and fair postwar election in the Soviet area of influence. Consequently, KSČ chairman Gottwald demanded to lead the government due to the majority of the socialist parties in the National Front (the social democrats and the socialists), but the ČSD refused. Similarly, the Communists refused to give the premiership to the Republicans. President Edvard Beneš, not himself a Communist but very amenable to cooperation with the Soviets, invited incumbent Prime Minister Václav Majer of the ČSD to remain as prime minister. Although the government had a non-Communist majority (five Communists and eighteen non-Communists), the KSČ had initial control over key ministries such as those dealing with the interior (police) and social welfare.
However, by the summer of 1947 the KSČ had alienated whole blocs of potential voters. The activities of the police—headed by Interior Minister Václav Nosek, a Communist—were acutely offensive to many citizens; farmers objected to talk of collectivization, and some workers were angry at Communist demands that they increase output without being given higher wages. The general expectation was that the Communists would be defeated in the May 1948 elections.
July 1947 crisis[]
On 5 June 1947 U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall made an offer of American aid to promote European recovery and reconstruction. Most Czechoslovak parties were eager to share in the U.S. aid, which they needed in order to complete the Two-Year Economic Plan of 1946–1948. The Communists were skeptical to the offer, but nonetheless agreed to accept the invitation. On 4 July the cabinet voted unanimously to accept the invitation to send a delegation to a preliminary conference of European states in Paris to discuss the Marshall Plan scheduled on 12 July.
The unanimous acceptance of the Marshall Plan by the cabinet precipitated the so-called July crisis. On 9 July, Prime Minister Majer and Jan Masaryk, the Czechoslovak foreign minister, were summoned to Moscow on 9 July and berated by Stalin for considering Czechoslovakia's possible involvement with and joining of the Marshall Plan. Stalin warned that this would contribute to the isolation of the Soviet Union. Masaryk in turn protested that Czechoslovak industry was dependent on the West. Representatives of the industries believed it was expedient to participate in the conference, so that they would not miss an opportunity to get credits. As a result, the decision of the Czechoslovak government to participate in the conference in Paris on 12 July 1947 was taken unanimously by all political parties. Stalin and Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov in turn warned that by accepting the plan the Soviet Union would consider this a violation of the 1935 and 1938 alliances and a signal of Czechoslovakia aligning themselves with the West, and thus damage Soviet-Czechoslovak relations. He warned Majer and Masaryk that if the Czechoslovaks had travelled to Paris by 4 a.m. on the 12 July ― the day the conference started — the Czechoslovaks would face the consequences.
The Communist acceptance of the offer was a result of a misunderstanding brought about by Soviet inefficiency. Gottwald had sought advance Soviet approval for accepting the invitation, but Valerian Zorin, the Soviet ambassador, and M. Bodrov, the charge d'affaires in Czechoslovakia, lacked instructions. Failing to get a reply from Moscow in time, the Communist cabinet members voted in favour of accepting the invitation. Upon receiving instructions from Moscow not to accept the invitation, the Communist Party withdrew their acceptance and voiced their opposition to the invitation, citing fears that the American plan would result in the "economic enslavement of Czechoslovakia." After a stormy cabinet meeting the non-Communist ministers voted in favor of participating in the conference. On 12 July, Masaryk led the delegation at the conference.
Meanwhile, Prime Minister Majer received warnings from US Secretary of State George Marshall, who'd informed him that anti-communism was a pre-condition for receiving American Marshall Plan aid, and Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt who had directly asked Majer to remove the KSČ from the government.
That September, at the first Cominform meeting, Andrei Zhdanov observed that Soviet victory had helped achieve "the complete victory of the working class over the bourgeoisie in every East European land except Czechoslovakia, where the power contest still remains undecided." This clearly implied the KSČ should be accelerating its own efforts to take complete power, before Czechoslovakia could accede to the Marshall Plan. The KSČ's number-two leader, general secretary Rudolf Slánský, represented the KSČ at the meeting. He returned to Prague with a plan for the final seizure of power. The KSČ pursued a two-pronged strategy. The party knew it had to maintain the façade of working within the electoral political system and was aware that a revolutionary coup would be unacceptable. It desired to gain an absolute majority at elections scheduled for 1948, but the fracturing of the left-wing coalition made this unrealistic. This pushed the party into extra-parliamentary action. The organization of "spontaneous" demonstrations to "express the will of the people" and continuous visits to parliament by workers' delegations were meant to ensure "mobilization of the masses".
Increasing political tensions[]
As cabinet members of the non-Communist parties became increasingly critical of the irregularity of the methods used by the Communists, and especially of their infiltration of into various branches of state security, more and more revelations about brutal police interrogations, improper procedures and mass intimidation campaigns were brought to light. These were immediately countered by resolutions, speeches, telegrams and articles from the Communists about reactionary plotters in the "anti-state" democratic parties. The communist press began to systematically impugn the loyalty of the other parties and vilify their leaders. On 10 September the public were shocked by the revelation of an assassination attempt on the non-Communist politicians Jan Masaryk, Petr Zenkl, Prokop Drtina and Josef Černý, who had received parcel bombs (also known as the Krčmaň affair). The Communist Minister of Interior, Václav Nosek, and the communist-dominated police force known as the National Security Corps (Czech: Sbor národní bezpečnosti, SNB; Slovak: Zbor národnej bezpečnosti, ZNB) showed a curious lack of interest in the case.
From September 1947, there was a growing sense of Communist-led purge as the Communist-led Ministry of Interior using salami tactics. The Communists resorted to “mobilizing the masses” through organized strikes, petitions, demonstrations, and telegram campaigns every time one of its demands or proposals were blocked by the members of the other parties in the National Front. Meanwhile, the police appeared to uncover “plots” and “conspiracies” with increasing frequency. In November 1947, the StB (Státní bezpečnost, or “State Security”) initiated a wave of arrests of as they supposedly uncovered a plot of the armed anti-communist group “Akce Sever” (“Action North”), linked to the former legionnaire and connected to the Republican Party, who had planned to organize an anti-communist coup. About 500 people were arrested by the police in connection with the plot, while the Ministry of Interior claimed that leading Republican officials like Černý, Ján Ursíny, Fedor Hodža and Ladislav Feierabend were implicated in the conspiracy. The Republicans vehemently condemned the claims of the StB in what was later dubbed the Mostecká affair.
During the winter of 1947–48, both in the cabinet and in parliament tension between the Communists and their opponents led to increasingly bitter conflict. First, conflict arose over the issue of adjusting salaries of state and public employees. In addition, the already long-lasting conflict between the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice escalated on 21 January 1948 as the Minister of Justice, Prokop Drtina of the National Socialists, demanded an investigation of the Krčmaň case, which he criticized for being politically motivated. At a secret cabinet meeting, a sharp argument erupted between Nosek and Drtina as the latter presented evidence that the Mostecká affair had been a communist provocations similar to the Krčmaň affair. Drtina proposed the establishment of a commission of ministers, which would investigate the "suspicious" activities of the Ministry of the Interior.
Chronology[]
Václav Nosek, the Communist Minister of the Interior.
On 12 February 1948, Nosek illegally extended his powers by suspending the last eight non-communist police commissioners in Prague, thus purging the SNB in the capital which now was completely in the hands of the communists. The same day, the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement (Czech: Revoluční odborové hnutí, Slovak: Revolučné odborové hnutie; ROH) issued a call to the workers’ factory councils to meet in Prague on 22 February. These actions convinced the democratic parties that the communists were about to move.
On 13 February, cabinet members from the Republicans, Czechoslovak People’s Party and the National Socialists precipitated a crisis by requesting Nosek to explain the dismissal of the eight SNB commissioners and their proposed replacement with eight KSČ party members. After a stormy parliamentary debate, the non-communist MPs subsequently passed a motion introduced by the National Socialists against the KSČ's votes (19–5) to instruct Nosek to reinstate the police commissioners and desist from further personnel changes in the SNB. The motion would also establish a commission headed by the MP Bohumír Bunža (ČSL), whose task was to investigate the methods of investigative bodies at the Ministry of the Interior.
Hubert Ripka, the Deputy Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak People's Party (ČSNS).
At the subsequent cabinet meeting on 17 February, Deputy Prime Minister Hubert Ripka asked whether the motion had been implemented. The Communist Deputy Prime Minister Gottwald dismissed the question and argues the necessity of discussing the topic in the absence of the Minister of the Interior Nosek, who had excused himself for health reasons. At noon, Prime Minister Majer interrupted the cabinet meeting to meet President Beneš and inform him of the incipient government crisis and the intention of the non-communist parties to establish a caretaker government. Beneš assured Majer that if it is necessary to appoint a new government, it will be composed of representatives of all political parties. When the cabinet reconvened later that day, Majer called an extraordinary cabinet meeting for Friday, 20 February, at which he demanded Minister of the Interior Nosek’s participation and his resignation unless he reinstate the police commissioners.
Following the meeting, the non-Communist ministers met in the office of Prime Minister Majer and demanded that unless the government's motion was fulfilled unconditionally, Majer would ask President Beneš to dismiss all Communist ministers from the government. Despite the internal disagreement between the left wing (led by Zdeněk Fierlinger) and the right wing (led by Majer), the non-communists still constituted a majority in the cabinet. President Beneš would thus be forced to either dismiss the Communist cabinet ministers or accept the resignation of the cabinet and appoint a new prime minister and cabinet. Meanwhile, The Presidium of the Central Committee of the KSČ immediately proclaimed a state of emergency for all its members, and began organizing People’s Militias. The next day, the National Socialists Zenkl and Ripka met with Beneš, who agreed with their decision to insist on the implementation of the cabinet motion of 13 February.
20 February[]
On 20 February 1948, the non-communist ministers forced a showdown when Prime Minister Majer asked Gottwald whether Nosek would comply with the motion or resign. When Nosek announced the dismissal of the police would remain in force, Majer demanded Nosek’s resignation, which he refused. Subsequently, Majer announced he would ask President Beneš to dismiss all Communist cabinet ministers. At 03:40 p.m. Majer accompanied by Minister of Defence Sergěj Ingr met with Beneš and asked him to form a new cabinet without the communists. During the evening meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the KSČ, Gottwald and Slánský decided to call a large demonstration on the Old Town Square for the next day. They also decided to call for the establishment of action committees of the National Front. At night, preparations began to arm selected workers' sections, and the police occupied post offices and selected buildings.
21 February[]
On the morning of 21 February 1948, demonstrations in support of the communists took place in major cities. In front of a crowd of 100,000 at the Old Town Square in Prague, Gottwald warned of the “reactionary bloc” who had formed to obstruct the popular policies of the communists. Since they had precipitated the crisis, they had excluded themselves from the National Front and now urged Beneš to form a new government headed by the Communists. Gottwald also appealed for action committees to form themselves and remove “reactionary” and “submersive elements” from public life. Simultaneously, several counter-demonstrations of the other non-communist parties took place, but they were attacked and dispersed by specially trained police regiments. Meanwhile, the police assumed guard of the Czech Radio station, post and telegraph offices, and railway stations. While the Communists began organizing People’s Militias, the action committees now began taking over the leadership of organizations and local offices of political parties, dismissed employees and gave instructions for arrests. At 11:00 a.m. the president received a five-member delegation of trade unionists from the Old Town Square. The discussion was heated as the trade unionists told the president that he had to submit to the will of the people. At a meeting with a delegation of social democrats, Beneš expressed the wish that the crisis be resolved by negotiating within the existing structure of the National Front and transforming the government with the participation of all parties.
22 February[]
The following day, at the request of Antonín Zápotocký, eight thousand trade union delegates gathered at the Palace of Industry in Prague, where the communists took the initiative. While the communists expressed support for Gottwald, called for further nationalization, and approved a one-hour general strike for 24 February, the National Socialists and half of the Social Democrats, walked out in protest. At the castle, President Beneš was inundated with telegrams and petitions from delegations of factory workers insisting that he ask Gottwald to form a cabinet. Meanwhile, Gottwald tried to circumvent Majer and threatened the Deputy Chairman Laušman that if he did not accept the communist demands to join them in a left-wing cabinet, the pro-communist wing of the Social Democracy would break away.
23 February[]
On 23 February, the Ministry of the Interior decided to arm the People's Militia with 10,000 rifles and 2,000 sub machine guns from the armament factory Zbrojovka Brno. The ministry also issued instructions to the SNP to limit and ban the activities of non-communist parties, especially public meetings organized by non-communist parties, stop the supply of paper to printers printing newspapers and leaflets of these parties. The SNP also increased their arrests and repressions, including arresting the officials who were involved with the investigations of the Krčmaň and Mostecká affairs. In an effort to deescalate the situation, President Beneš received Gottwald at 11:00 a.m. and urged him to order Nosek to rescind the police order and to work within the existing National Front. Gottwald, however, was adamant, claiming the National Front no longer existed. Gottwald demanded that he dismiss Prime Minister Majer's government and appoint a new government headed by Gottwald and the Communists. When Beneš asked: “And if I don't dismiss Majer's cabinet?", Gottwald threatened the president not only with the declaration of a general strike, but also that the Soviet Union would intervene militarily.
The Czechoslovak Army (ČSA) had been following the escalating political crisis with increasing concern. Acting as a counterbalance to the communist-dominated intelligence service StB, the Czechoslovak military intelligence (Fifth Department of the General Staff), headed by General František Moravec had closely monitored the activities of the KSČ, the action committees and the People’s Militia. As Moravec received reports of the arming of the people’s militia on 23 February, the military intelligence concluded that a communist uprising was imminent, forcing Moravec to convene a secret emergency meeting with the Minister of Defence, General Ingr, the Chief of the General Staff, General Lev Prchala, and the deputy Chief of Staff, General Ludvík Svoboda. Ingr instructed the General Staff to make preparations for military deployment as part of a nationwide martial law, while he would inform Prime Minister Majer and the non-Communist cabinet members of the Communist plans.
As Ingr presented Moravec’s report to the emergency cabinet meeting, the non-Communists shockingly realized they had been taken by surprise. While the communists had brilliantly used the instruments of power and propaganda to mobilize their supporters, the non-Communist had underestimated the scope of the protests. Since the SNP now had begun limiting the activities of the non-Communist parties and arresting members of the parties’ leadership, Majer and the other ministers concluded military intervention and martial law was their last resort to stop the Communists. As martial law had to be declared by the Chairmen of the two Provincial National Committees and the Slovak National Committee with presidential approval, The cabinet telephoned the chairman Martin Hrabík (RS) of Bohemia, Adolf Klimek (ČSL) of Moravia and the Head of the Slovak Board of Commissioenrs, Jozef Tiso (ČSL), to resist the Communist-led action committes, prepare to declare martial law and to await final orders.
At 5 p.m., President Beneš received Majer and the cabinet ministers, who informed him of the intelligence report of the imminent communist coup. Visibly shaken, Beneš assured them that he would not give in to communist pressure and would promote his concept even at the cost of resignation. However, Beneš still withheld from the cabinet’s request of dismissing the communist ministers and declaration of martial law. Later that evening, more than 50,000 non-communist protesters marched to the Castle to voice their support for Beneš and urged him to dismiss the communists from the government.
24 February[]
President Edvard Beneš, President of Czechoslovakia.
At noon on 24 February, over 1.5 million workers took part in a one-hour general strike organized by the Communist Party and the communist-led trade unions to demonstrate support for Gottwald and to increase the pressure on President Beneš to accept Gottwald's proposed solution to the government crisis. Meanwhile, the Action Committees seized the National Socialist newspaper Svobodné slovo and the People’s Party’s Lidová demokracie, while they continued their efforts to repress the Republicans, National Socialists and the People’s Party.
At the Social Democrats, the situation deteriorated dramatically as the several-day dispute between its members now turned into an open conflict. The presidency of the Social Democracy has been in session since the morning, where both Majer and Laušman had rejected Gottwald’s offer to join a Communist-led government. In response, militiamen from the People’s Militia and selected communists, headed by the pro-Communist social democrat Fierlinger, now began to occupy the party's central secretariat building. This step, planned by the Communists, was meant to to replace the existing ČSD leadership with Fierlinger and his supporters willing to submit to the demands of the Communists. A struggle ensued where the communist occupiers were repulsed, which allowed for Prime Minister Majer to escape. After the arrival of several dozen other militiamen, they regained the building. By 8 p.m., the party's central secretariat was completely in the hands of the communists. The People's House was subsequently occupied by the Communists. Under the pressure of these circumstances, the party presidency decided to participate in Gottwald's new government. As the Presidium of the KSČ planned their next step, they agreed that Gottwald , Zápotocký and Nosek would ask President Beneš to accept the ministers' resignation and to hand Beneš the charter of the new government. In case the president rejected Gottwald's proposals, the Communists would organize another general strike.
At 5 p.m., Beneš again received Prime Minister Majer, accompanied by Justice Minister Drtina, Deputy Prime Minister Ursíny, Defence Minister Ingr and Chief of Staff, General Prchala. After a heated argument, Beneš caved and signed the decree dismissing the five Communist cabinet ministers (Klement Gottwald, Václav Nosek, Viliam Široký, Jozef Šoltész and Alexej Čepička) and the decree declaring a state of emergency and martial law. The three provincial chairmen Hrabík, Klimek and Tiso were instructed to declare martial law the following day and to coordinate with the Army. Over 25,000 posters announcing martial law, which had been secretly printed by the Army, were distributed. Meanwhile, Army formations were placed on full preparedness.
25 February: Martial law[]
ST-I tank destroyers of the Czechoslovak Army passing by communist protesters in Prague, 25 February 1948.
At precisely 00:00 (12:00 a.m.), the Czechoslovak Army went into action as they deployed 70,000 soldiers supported by 350 tanks and other armoured vehicles. General Bohumil Boček, commander of 1st Military District, headed the military operation in Northeastern Bohemia, General Jan Šípek of the 2nd Military District headed the military operation in southwestern Bohemia, General Zdeněk Novák of the 3rd Military District carried out the operation in Moravia while General Rudolf Viest of the 4th Military District organized the military response in Slovakia. The army stormed telecommunications exchange facilities and cut telephone lines to prevent the communists from coordinating their response. In an effort to de-escalate the crisis and to avoid a surge of sympathy for the Communists, army formations were under strict orders from the General Staff to only open fire if fired upon first.
In Prague and its surrounding localities, General Alois Liška’s 1st Fast Division quickly took control of the telecommunications exchange facilities and placed tanks in strategic positions in Prague, effectively gaining complete control of the city. Radio stations, ministries and governmental offices occupied by the People’s Militia were also besieged. Before being seized by army troops, the communist-controlled Czech Radio broadcast an appeal to the workers of Prague to build barricades in order to slow the anticipated Army advances. At 02:00 a company of the 11th Infantry Brigade reached Czech Radio at Vinohradská 12 and attempted to swarm the building, but the SNB police troops — armed with submachine guns — and forced the Army troops to regroup. At 04:00 Army troops returned with tank support in a second attempt to swarm the building. Fierce fighting inside the building and in the nearby buildings for four hours until the Army had seized control of the radio station.
At 09:00, General Svoboda declared martial law over radio:
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Czechoslovak Army, General Ludvík Svoboda, announcing the declaration of martial law, 25 February 1948. Prime Minister Václav Majer (centre) and Republican Party chairman Josef Černý (right) watches on.
| “ | Dear citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic.
In the past months, we have regrettably witnessed our democracy has fallen into a deep political crisis, which, if it was to deteriorate, would lead to a threat to the freedom and life of the nation of the Czechoslovak state. Upon request by the Chairmen of the Provincial National Committees of Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia, and the Chairman of the Board of Commissioners of Slovakia, and in understanding with the President of the Republic Dr. Edvard Beneš, the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic, and the President of the Supreme Administrative Court, the Czechoslovak Army have this morning carried out measures throughout the entire country to secure the freedom and life of the nation of the Czechoslovak state. Until further notice, starting at 10:30 on the 25th of February 1948, the Provincial National Committees of Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia, and the Board of Commissioners of Slovakia, have declared a state of martial law and a curfew starting at 19:00, exempt only to members of the armed forces. Citizens with weapons, as well as ammunition and explosives, are obliged to hand over these arms the armed forces, even if they have permission to hold them, within 12 hours at the nearest district office, the nearest gendarmerie station or police office. This operation has not been carried out against any particular person or political group. The Czechoslovak Army will not allow any person to be stripped of their personal freedom, nor will it tolerate any attempts by groups to limit the personal freedoms of others. No matter who and which political party they support, every citizen will be treated according to the principles of the Law. Parliamentary elections planned for this spring will be held as scheduled, in a free and fair manner and under the supervision and arbitrator of an impartial administration. The election will be handed to the winners, regardless which faction that emerge victorious. We also address our neighbors and the whole world. This operation aims to fully comply with the United Nations Charters and the principles of human rights. The Czechoslovak government are still compliant to commitments established with our foreign partners. We request our citizens to facilitate the duty of our armed forces, and assist in reestablishing the nationally desired people's democratic regime with respect and understanding towards each other without hatred. In the words of our President-Liberator, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk: The truth will prevail. |
” |
–General Ludvík Svoboda, Radio broadcast, 25 February 1948. | ||
T-34/85 tanks of the Czechoslovak Army in Prague on 25 February 1948.
In Prague, the communists had already been preparing a large demonstration on Wenceslas Square since the early hours of the morning, saying that if the proposal of the new government was rejected, the demonstrators would move to the Presidential Palace at the Hradčany. At noon, a group of 400 Communist protesters gathered at Wenceslas Square, where they stopped and waved a Czechoslovak and Communist flags. Tensions escalated, and when after the Army soldiers suposedly were fired upon by SNB policemen, the soldiers returned fire; 31 died and others were seriously injured, while the lucky ones were able to escape. Sporadic firefights also erupted at the various factories where the KSČ had begun arming the People's Militia. However, the vast majority of the 6,000 armed militiamen surrerendered to the Army. In Slovakia, Jozef Tiso, the Chairman of the Slovak Board of Commissioners, supported by the Republican chairman of the Slovak National Council, Jozef Lettrich, had already acted the evening before when he dismissed the Communist ministers of the Board of Commissioners. By early morning, the army had taken control of Bratislava and arrested Husák.
By noon, most of Czechoslovakia was in the hands of the Army. In Prague, only the Ministry of the Interior on Vyšehradská 427 and the Office of the Central Committee of the KSČ at Na Příkopě 33 were still holding out. The Czechoslovak Army had encircled the buildings, and after SNB policemen had opened fire on the soldiers outside, army tanks began to shell the building, punching holes in the front of it. By 15:00, troops entered the building and and began to occupy it, floor by floor. Hostilities were stopped several times to allow some civilian workers to leave. After hours of heavy fighting, Minister Nosek and the Communists capitulated to the soldiers at 20:15 and were arrested. By 19:00, resistance in the streets was completely suppressed, barring occasional sniper fire by SNB policemen or Communist militiamen.
26 February[]
In Prague, the Army had opted to encircle the Office of the Central Committee of the KSČ, where Gottwald and Slánský were barricaded with most of the KSČ. After having negotiated the conditions of their surrender, Gottwald, Slánský, Široký and others were taken into custody at 07:30 a.m. Fierlinger and other leading KSČ members, like Zápotocký, Vladimír Clementis and Antonín Novotný, were taken into custody within the following 48 hours.
Aftermath[]
The coup attempt against the last remaining democracy in Eastern Europe came as a profound shock to millions. Western eyes saw how close Czechoslovak independence and democracy were to be snuffed out by a foreign totalitarian dictatorship for the second time in a decade.
Although the USSR had failed in completing the formation of a monolithic Soviet bloc, the coup attempt vindicated and certainly crystallized the pessimistic appraisals of Soviet power in the West by people who felt certain that it was folly to try to do business with Moscow. Because its impact was equally profound in Western Europe as in the United States, it helped unify Western countries against the Communist bloc. It gave an air of prescience to the French and Italian governments for having forced their local Communists out of their governments a year earlier.
Czechoslovak political development[]
Following the failure of the coup d'état attempt, the Army and the non-Communist parties moved quickly to consolidate their power. On 27 February, Beneš swore in the new ministers in Majer's National Front government, bolstering the non-Communist claims that their actions had been perfectly legal. In total, 7,500 communists were arrested, however many lower-ranking members were quickly released. The National Assembly, freely elected two years earlier, gave Majer's revamped government a vote of confidence on 10 March 1948 with 219 votes in favour. Of the 81 Communist MPs elected in 1946, 42 were still in custody and could not participate in the vote. On 3 March, the National Front decided to remove the KSČ from the coalition.
In the aftermath of the crackdown, the new Minister of Interior, Republican chairman Josef Černý, established a "democratic vetting commission" to purge the SNB for communist ideologues and agents of the secret police. More than 5,000 other commissioned police officers were dismissed or forced into retirement. Similarly, the Army also launched purges to dismiss or force pro-Communist officers into retirement. In 1948, the newly-formed Federal Assembly passed the Federal Police Corps Act (Act No. 283/1948), which impemented a comprehensive reform of the country's police forces. The SNB was abolished while the new Federal Police Corps (Czech: Federální policejní sbor, FPS Slovak: Federálny policajný zbor, FPZ) was established. On a state level, the law also established state police forces for Bohemia (Czech: Český policejní sbor, ČPS), Moravia (Czech: Moravský policejní sbor, MPS), Silesia (Czech: Slezky policejní sbor, SPS) and Slovakia (Slovak: Slovenský policajný zbor, SPZ). The StB was replaced by the Federal Security Information Service (Czech: Federální bezpečnostní informační služba; Slovak: Federálna bezpečnostná informačná služba; FBIS) with the Federal Security Information Service Act (Act No. 291/1948).
Discussion also arose over the issue of prohibiting the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The Republicans and the right wing of the People's Party advocated in favour of banning the party, while the Social Democrats, which had been divided during the February crisis, were opposed. The right organized demonstrations demanding the state ban the Communist Party and criminalize the propagation of communism like Nazism. The Communists arranged counter-demonstrations refusing the comparison, pointing to the Soviet Union and the Communists' role in defeating Fascism and Nazism during World War II. President Beneš, in an effort to reduce tensions with the Soviet Union, announced on 18 March that the KSČ would remain a legal party and were elligible to participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections under the condition the party agreed to operate under the democratic conditions of the republic.
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| Klement Gottwald (left) and Rudolf Slánský (right) during the Gottwald trials, 1949. | |
On 9 May 1948, the third anniversary of the liberation of Prague, the National Assembly passed the new constitution that the National Front had promised in 1946. The 1948 Constitution defined Czechoslovakia as a federation comprising four constituent states referred to as "Lands" (Czech: Země, Slovak: Zeme): Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and Slovakia. According to the constitution, each state would have its own constitution, state government and devolved legislature known as Land Assembly (Czech: Zemský shromáždění, Slovak: Zemské zhromaždenie), thus finally fulfilling the promises of the Martin Declaration of 1918 and the "Slovak Magna Carta" of 1945. Federal elections went ahead, as scheduled, on 30 May 1948, amid U.S. intervention in the election by heavily funding the non-Communist parties and launching an anti-communist propaganda campaign in Czechoslovakia. The non-Communists, led by Prime Minister Majer's ČSD and Černý's Republicans, won a sweeping victory, taking 246 of the 300 seats in the new Chamber of Deputies and 118 seats in the Senate. The RS remained the largest party with 30.55% of the vote and 93 seats, an increase of eight seats, while the ČSD, with its 23.06% of the vote, had won an additional 16 seats for a total of 70. The Communists, which came in third with 18.10%, suffered heavy losses as dropped 8.58 percentage points and was reduced to 54 seats, a loss of 27. Both Gottwald and Antonín Novotný, the election leader of the KSČ, criticized the elections as unfree because of the "brutal foreign intervention by the Americans". Following the election, the non-Communist parties formed a unity government with Majer remaining prime minister.
Gottwald, Slánský, Zápotocký, Husák and their closest accomplices were charged with treason in the form of a conspiracy aimed at capturing power. However, by April 1948, Soviet pressure forced the Majer government to release them from custody pending trial while remaining under surveillance. The trial (officially Proces s vedením protistátního spikleneckého centra v čele s Klementem Gottwaldem, English: "Trial of the Leadership of the Anti-State Conspiracy Centre Headed by Klement Gottwald") of Gottwald and ten other high-ranking Communists involved with the coup began on 31 May 1949. On 15 October 1949, the Czechoslovak National Court (Národný súd) found them guilty of "state treason" and sentenced them all to 20 years in prison. However, in an effort to pursue rapprochement with the Soviet Union, President Masaryk declared on 23 February 1952 an amnesty for all of four main accomplices. Additionally, the Procuracy had refrained from charging numerous other individuals accused of complicity in the coup.
Soviet response[]
In light of the close relationship between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, and the close friendship betweeb Stalin and Gottwald developed a close friendship during the war and the postwar years, the Soviet Union fiercely condemned the actions of the Czechoslovak government. The Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Valerian Zorin, who had arrived in Prague during the crisis, called the crackdown a violation of civil rights of the Communists and a "reactionary response forced by Western imperialist interests", while Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov claimed that Czechoslovaks had violated the 1938 Treaty of Friendship and Post-War Cooperation, done irreparable damage to Czechoslovak-Soviet relations and demanded the release of Gottwald and the other communists. The Soviets also launched a massive propaganda campaign condemning Britain and the United States for intervening in the crisis.
On 1 March 1948, the Politburo of the USSR discussed how to respond to the failed coup attempt and the crackdown of the KSČ by the Czechoslovak government. Led by Molotov, the hardline faction of the CPSU voted for military intervention, but were opposed by Nikita Khrushchev, Kliment Voroshilov and Andrei Zhdanov who feared that such a move would definitively push Czechoslovakia into the Western fold and strengthen Western efforts to unify against the Communist bloc. As a result, on 4 March, the Presidium of the CPSU decided to not depose the new Czechoslovak government.
From Moscow's point of view, the coup attempt could not have come at a worse time. The government crisis in Prague lasted from 20 to 27 February, just when Western foreign ministers were meeting in London. From the West's perspective, the coup attempt was an example of Communism in its most unacceptable form; Moscow seemed to the West bent on ruthlesly forming a monolithic Soviet bloc and the suppression of freedom. The failed coup also finally discredited Soviet moves to prevent the formation of a West German state. Until early 1948, Western and Soviet representatives had communicated in regular meetings at the foreign minister level; the Czechoslovak coup attempt constituted a final rupture in relations between the two superpowers, with the West now signaling its determination to commit itself to collective self-defence. By early March, even a previously wavering France was demanding a concrete military alliance with definite promises to help in certain circumstances.
Following the February crisis, Foreign Minister Masaryk and the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry worked hard to mitigate the damage to Soviet-Czechoslovak relations. At the request of Beneš, Masaryk travelled to the Soviet Union on 16 March 1948 to reassure the Soviets that the friendship and peaceful collaboration between the countries outlined in the 1935 and 1938 treaties of friendship remained a cornerstone of the Czechoslovak foreign policy. Despite their planned accession to the Marshall Plan, Czechoslovakia intended to pursue a policy of non-alignment and a bridge between the East and West. Negotiations began to make progress when the Majer government released Gottwald and the KSČ leadership from custody on 7 April 1948. In response, Stalin on 18 April 1948 sent a letter to Beneš proposing that the two countries should sign a new treaty of friendship and cooperation. Beneš and Masaryk argued to the outside world that the Soviet had only defensive ambitions and that Czechoslovakia's independence could best be secured by meeting the Soviet Union with regard to the proposed treaty. On 8 June 1948, the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed by President Beneš and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, laying the foundation for Czechoslovak neutrality and economic cooperation between the Eastern Bloc and Czechoslovakia. The rift was finally resolved on 22 June 1948 when the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of the Federal Assembly) passed the federal constitutional law on Czechoslovak neutrality.
Fearing U.S. interference in the he 1948 elections, the Soviets provided substantial diplomatic and financial aid for the KSČ during the election campaign. In contrast to the limited financial aid to the Italian Communist Party (PSI) in the Italian elections earlier that year, Czechoslovakia was geographically in the middle of the Soviet sphere of influence, and the Soviets feared that inaction in Czechoslovakia would set a precedent for U.S. intervention in Eastern Europe. The Soviets provided 31.8 million roubles to the (USD 6 million) to the KSČ. Stalin, satisfied of Czechoslovakia's pledged neutrality as stipulated in the 1948 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and the Law on Czechoslovak Neutrality of 8 June 1948, respected the result, considering Czechoslovakia a neutral country. The Soviet Foreign Ministry and the NKVD would, however, increase its espionage activities in the country.
United States[]
The coup's impact in the United States was immediate. Opposition towards the Marshall Plan had developed in the United States Congress, but a shocked and aroused public opinion overwhelmed this, and Congress promptly approved over US$5 billion for the first year of the European Recovery Program (ERP).
Until the February crisis, the emphasis in Washington had been on economic containment of communism, primarily through the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan and a heavy reliance on atomic power as a shield to support it. President Harry S. Truman understood that in 1946 and 1947 the American people were not prepared for a massive conventional arms buildup or a confrontation with the Soviet Union. He was reluctant to increase the military budget dramatically and instead chose a gradual and balanced buildup. Expecting to spend large amounts on the Marshall Plan, he sought to keep the annual defence budget below $15 billion. However, the crisis served to expose the limitations of U.S. conventional forces and its over-reliance on atomic power. At the time of the Prague crisis, roughly ten ill-equipped and poorly trained U.S. and West European divisions faced over thirty Soviet divisions. When taking into account Defense Department complaints that the U.S. atomic arsenal and the air power to use it were starkly inadequate, it became clear that the U.S. lacked a credible military deterrent in Europe.
The failed Czechoslovak coup attempt changed the whole tone of the debate on the U.S. military budget. It helped spark a new round of Pentagon lobbying for a substantial rise in the military budget, while the National Security Council (NSC) called for "a worldwide counter-offensive" against the Soviet bloc, including U.S. military aid to the Western European countries. Truman responded to the crisis with a grim nationwide radio address on 17 March calling for a renewal of selective service, which had been allowed to lapse the previous year. He also sought congressional approval for a programme of Universal Military Training (UMT). He aimed to send a signal of determination to the Soviet Union that U.S. military posture was strong and that the country with this expansion of military preparedness was also prepared in the future to rearm massively if necessary. Congress rejected UMT, but did vote to resume selective service, and voted the money for a seventy-group air force, 25% larger than the official request.
The crisis-like atmosphere after the coup attempt in early 1948 caused a brief but intense war scare where the fear of war between the Soviets and the West reached a high point. On 5 March, General Lucius D. Clay sent an alarming telegram from Berlin that advised of its likelihood: "Within the last few weeks, I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude which I cannot define but which now gives me a feeling that it may come with dramatic suddenness". General Omar Bradley later wrote that when he read Clay's "lugubrious assessment" in Washington he was "lifted right out of [his] chair", and National Security Advisor George F. Kennan wrote that the coup and the telegram had combined to create "a real war scare" where "the military and the intelligence fraternity" had "overreacted in the most deplorable way". Only a week later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended rearmament and a restoration of the draft. In fact, Clay's warning had more to do with a request by Army director of intelligence Lt. Gen. Stephen Chamberlain for material that would persuade Congress to spend more on military readiness than with any hard evidence of Soviet intent to launch a war in Europe. Still, in Europe too in February and March "war was being commonly, even calmly discussed in streets and cafes on the Continent", a fear exacerbated by reports on 27 February that Stalin had invited Finland to sign a treaty of mutual assistance, contributing to expectations the Soviets would instigate a similar crisis there; pressure for a treaty was placed on Norway too.
A series of quick fixes followed to ensure that American forces would not be caught completely off guard in the event of war. More important was the sensitivity with which American officials now treated the nervousness of their European counterparts; the Americans now became more willing to take steps to boost morale in Europe and ease the now-widespread anxieties there. The coup attempt and the Berlin Blockade that June made clear that constant reassurance was needed to bind the Europeans to the U.S. system; hence, the remobilization of U.S. armed forces began.
Amidst the general alarm, more sanguine voices were also raised. On 2 March, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter had written to Truman that "the timing of the coup attempt in Czechoslovakia was forced upon the Kremlin when the non-Communists took action endangering Communist control of the police. A Communist victory in the May elections would have been impossible without such control". on 10 March, the CIA reported that "We do not believe...that this event reflects any sudden increase in Soviet capabilities, more aggressive intentions, or any change in current Soviet policy or tactics... The Czech coup attempt and the demands on Finland...do not preclude the possibility of Soviet efforts to effect a rapprochement with the West". Kennan wrote that the Prague coup attempt and the Berlin Blockade were "defensive reactions" to the Marshall Plan's initial successes and to the Western decision to press for an independent West German state.
The American Ambassador in Prague, Laurence A. Steinhard worried that the KSČ following the failed coup attempt would receive financial support by the Soviet Union ahead of the scheduled federal elections on 30 May. While the general expectation was that the Communists would be soundly defeated, the CIA and the State Department decided to take precautionary measures. Under the cover of the National Security Act of 1947, which made foreign covert operations possible, the CIA directly provided USD 1 million to the Czechoslovak democratic parties: the Republican Party (RS), the Czechoslovak People's Party (ČSL), and the Czechoslovak Social Democracy (ČSD). In order to influence the election, the U.S. agencies undertook a campaign of covering political as well as campaign expenses, made numerous short-wave radio broadcasts and funded the publishing of books and articles, all of which reminded the Czechoslovaks of the failed Communist coup attempt in February and warned them of what was believed to be the consequences of a communist victory. Overall, the US funneled around USD 8 million into the country for specifically anti-KSČ purposes. The non-Communists eventually won the 1948 election with 246 of the 300 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, while the KSČ suffered a loss of 27 seats. The CIA's practice of influencing the political situation was repeated in every Czechoslovak election for at least the next 20 years.
France and Italy[]
In Italy, elections were scheduled for 18 April and the Communist-dominated Popular Democratic Front (Italian: Fronte Democratico Popolare, FDP) stood a realistic chance of victory. In the hysteria and foreboding that gripped Western circles following the Czechoslovak coup attempt, it was concluded that similar tactics could be employed in Italy, whose citizens might not even have a chance to vote. British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin and the British Cabinet saw the cooperation between the two leading parties of the Italian left in almost apocalyptic terms, believing that once the Italian Communist Party (PCI) won power it would marginalise any moderating influence from the socialists. Bevin immediately concluded that the "forces of democratic Socialism" must be strengthened in Italy, and that Britain must support the Christian Democrats, despite all of their faults.
Bevin, who saw Italy as "the immediate danger spot", was especially alarmed by the ability of the PCI, through the use of its dominant position in the trade union movement, to organise industrial disturbances not only to sabotage the success of the Marshall Plan, but also to subvert the Italian government through factory committees of action as in Czechoslovakia. The Italian foreign minister, Carlo Sforza, despite his alarm over the coup's timing, remained optimistic and assured Bevin that the army and police were in excellent shape and that the coup would have an adverse effect, turning swing voters away from the socialists.
This was observed when Communist and socialist leaders in Italy defended the Czechoslovak coup attempt as a victory for democracy, rationalizing that the violation of civil rights was a necessary and just response to a reactionary threat posed by Western imperialist (i.e., American) interests; such discourse probably damaged the Front's credibility and undercut its promises of moderation. Kennan cabled to suggest the PCI should be outlawed and the U.S. should intervene militarily in the likely event of a civil war, but he quickly softened his line.
The American Ambassador in Rome, James Clement Dunn, worried that the coup attempt would push self-interested voters to side with what they considered the winning side, and that events in Prague probably inspired the PCI to "direct the politics of the generally opportunistic Italian toward the Communist bandwagon". However, the coup attempt was one of several factors that led a strong plurality of voters to vote for Christian Democracy and defeat the left. The U.S. government's Voice of America radio began broadcasting anti-Communist propaganda to Italy on 24 March 1948, while the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assisted with USD 1 million to what they referred to as "center parties" and was accused of publishing forged letters to discredit the leaders of the PCI. U.S. agencies also sent ten million letters, made numerous short-wave radio broadcasts, and funded the publishing of books and articles, all of which warned Italians of the "consequences" of a communist victory. Overall, the U.S. funnelled USD 10 million to USD 20 million into the country for specifically anti-PCI purposes. The CIA also made use of off-the-books sources of financing to interfere in the election: millions of dollars from the Economic Cooperation Administration affiliated with the Marshall Plan and more than $10 million in captured Nazi money were steered to anti-communist propaganda.
The Christian Democrats eventually won the 1948 election with 48 percent of the vote, and the FDP received 31 percent. The CIA's practice of influencing the political situation would serve as an example for their interference in the Czechoslovak election scheduled for 30 May 1948, and would repeated in every Italian and Czechoslovak election for at least the next 24 years. While the CIA claimed the PCI received exorbitant funds of up to $10 million per month from the Soviet Union, the Soviets were in reality apprehensive about committing to Italy financially and only provided "occasional and modest" funds to the PCI. Stalin, satisfied that America had shown restraint after the Czech coup attempt and unwilling to provoke war, respected the result, considering Italy a Western country.
In France, interesting political currents were also set in motion. The United States was still pushing the French government to support German rehabilitation. In the aftermath of the coup attempt, foreign minister Georges Bidault was afraid of stoking anti-German sentiment that the French Communist Party (PCF) could exploit and harness to instigate a coup of its own. At the same time, the coup attempt had forced the hand of PCF leader Maurice Thorez, whose public remarks suggested that in the wake of a Soviet invasion, he would support the Red Army. The coup attempt in Czechoslovakia, the PCF's failed policy of sabotage, and the Marshall Plan's likely passage were all beginning to sway French public opinion. 70% of French people now believed the U.S. would do more than any other country to help France, compared to 7% who thought the USSR would do more. Despite French concern about Germany, it was becoming increasingly clear that the Soviet threat was greater than the German. France would still seek an advantageous power position vis-à-vis Germany, but it was becoming reconciled to the prospect of a rehabilitated Germany as part of postwar Europe.
Along with passage of the Marshall Plan, the other far-reaching implication of the Czechoslovak coup attempt for U.S. foreign policy was to heed Bevin's call for a Western defence association. He had found the Truman Administration reluctant to accept an unambiguous and binding alliance with Western Europe even after the irretrievable breakdown of the Council of Foreign Ministers conference in London in December 1947; Marshall was not prepared to accept the idea in discussions with Bevin that 17 December. On 26 February Bevin again reiterated that the best way to prevent another crisis like the one in Czechoslovakia was to evolve a joint Western military strategy, and this time he got a more receptive hearing, especially considering American anxiety over Italy. That spring, European leaders quietly met with U.S. defence, military and diplomatic officials at the Pentagon, under Marshall's orders, exploring a framework for a new and unprecedented association for mutual defence. The following year, on 4 April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would ultimately be born out of these talks.
See also[]
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