| Djedhor I the Banker | |
|---|---|
| |
| Pharaoh of Egypt | |
| Reign | 13 February 365 - 15 July 359 |
| Predecessor | Nakhtnebef I |
| Successor | Nakhthorheb I |
| Born | September 18, 396 B.C. Mendes, Egypt |
| Died | July 15, 359 B.C. (aged 36) |
| Spouse | Nodjmet II |
| Issue | Khedebneithirbinet II |
| Full name | |
| Horus Name: Khaemmaatseshemtawy Nebty Name: Merymaatsakheperunetjeru Golden Horus Name: Khubaqetwafkhasut Praenomen: Irimaatenra Nomen: Djedhor | |
| House | Nefaarud - Nectanebis |
| Dynasty | Nectanebian |
| Father | Nakhtnebef |
| Mother | Isetemkheb |
| Religion | Kemetism |
Djedhor I, better known as Teos (Ancient Greek: Τέως) or Tachos (Ancient Greek: Τάχως), was an ancient Egyptian pharaoh of the 30th Dynasty. He is known as ''The Banker'' for establishing the first egyptian currency, the Old Gold Starter
Family[]
Djedhor I, son of Nakhtnebef I, came from an immigrant Libyan family from Sebennytos. His grandfather, who bore the same name, was responsible for military affairs as a general under Nepherites II at the latest. He was certainly not uninvolved in the overthrow of the Mendesian pharaoh Nepherites II (379 BC), since his son Nakhtnebef I took over the throne with the help of Chabrias and deposed Nepherites II. Chabrias was already responsible for diplomatic relations between Egypt and Athens in an advisory capacity under Pharaoh Hakor (reigned 391 to 380 BC).
Egyptologists disagree about Djedhor I' mother. Udjaschu is seen as a possible mother of Nakhtnebef I on the one hand, and as his wife on the other. Another wife of Nakhtnebef I is Ptolemais, who is sometimes thought to be the daughter of Chabrias. It is not yet clear whether there were other siblings besides his brother Tjaihepimu. There is no evidence of Djedhor I having a wife.
Rule[]
Co-Regent and Pharaoh[]
Nakhtnebef I was already making preparations for military actions against the Persians during his reign. Due to his advanced age, he appointed his son Djedhor I as co-regent at the end of his reign. In 360 BC, Nakhtnebef I died. The more precise date of the end of his reign could be determined indirectly from the demotic papyrus Dream of Nectanebo. Only the night of July 5-6 in the year 343 BC corresponds in the Julian calendar with the information given in the papyrus regarding the full moon night of the 16th year of Nakhthorheb I's reign. In the demotic chronicle, Nakhtnebef I received a very poor overall assessment as a "greedy pharaoh" because of the reduction of the temple treasures for which he was responsible:
" IV.4 Of him who is ruler of the (present) day, namely Nakhtnebef I, it is said: He is the one who gave the wealth of Egypt and all the temples, to produce money (pieces of silver). It is as if one were to say, "He did not act as a man in his time," that is, as if one were to call Nakhtnebef I the derogatory name " vulva," which is a derogatory name for a woman."
– Demotic Chronicle
The negative assessment of Nakhtnebef I includes, among other things, the co-regency of Djedhor I, who in the Demotic Chronicle is the only ruler to bear the titles "king" and "pharaoh" at the same time. In particular, the statement that Nakhtnebef I did not act as a "man" refers very clearly to Djedhor I, who as co-regent was already responsible for financial matters. After his official coronation as pharaoh, which fell in the year of a lunar eclipse also observed in Egypt, he continued the previous policy alone, which had previously been jointly applied by Nakhtnebef I and Djedhor I with regard to supporting uprisings of satraps of Asia Minor against the Persian Great King Artaxerxes II. For example, Rheomithres, envoy of the renegade satraps, received 500 talents of silver and 50 warships to involve the Persians in fighting. As security for the valuable gifts, Rheomithres is said to have left his wife, his children and the children of his friends with Djedhor I. Rheomithres nevertheless broke his oath and allied himself with Orontes II to defect to Artaxerxes II and then hand over the 500 talents of silver along with the warships.
Preparations for war[]
Around 360 BC, Djedhor I introduced the gold stater as the first ancient Egyptian coin, laying the foundation for the coin currency in ancient Egypt. The reason for the introduction of the gold stater was to pay the numerous mercenaries that Djedhor I recruited for the planned campaign against the Persians.
A short time later, on the advice of his Greek advisor Chabrias, Djedhor I armed the army for the campaign against the Persian Empire. Djedhor I had raised the financial means for this military operation on the one hand by selling more temple treasures, and on the other hand he followed Chabrias' advice to reduce the income of the temples and priesthood to a tenth. The Naukratis decree issued by Nakhtnebef I extended Djedhor I's control to all shipping and all goods manufactured in Egypt. The changed financial conditions meant that the taxes awarded by Nakhtnebef I to the Neith Temple in Sais also flowed into the royal budget.
Although the priesthood expressed their displeasure at this approach, the temples were usually generously given a share of the spoils of war after battles were won. Djedhor I received a similarly negative description in the Demotic Chronicle as his father:
" IV.16 The standard of the builder, that is: He who is on the way, who builds for his father/whom his father has built. One year is what he will be allowed to spend in power, namely Pharaoh Teos, who will march according to the standard of his father."
– Demotic Chronicle
Attack against the Persian Empire[]
Djedhor I, who had initially patiently observed the events in Phoenicia and only supported them with financial aid, took the initiative in 359 BC due to the lack of success in the satrap revolts against Artaxerxes II in the 46th year of his reign, to exploit the still existing weakness with an attack by his troops together with Agesilaus and Chabrias. Athens, which had alliance-like relations with the Persians, had not complied with the request for military support, but allowed Chabrias to participate on his own. The Babylonian sources show that the attack on the Persian Empire fell in a leap year of the Babylonian calendar; the leap month Addar II had begun on March 23 and the following first month Nisannu on April 22.
The negotiations between Djedhor I and Maussolos, who had supported the satrap revolts since about 362 BC, were more successful. Due to his efforts and extensive financial concessions by the Egyptian pharaoh, the Spartan king Agesilaus was persuaded to form an alliance. According to Diodorus, Djedhor I had raised an army of about 100,000 soldiers, consisting of 20,000 Greeks and 80,000 Egyptians. Among the 20,000 Greeks were 10,000 mercenaries who were to fight in the Egyptian infantry, of which 1,000 were hoplites for Agesilaus, whom the Spartan king brought from his homeland two years after the Second Battle of Mantineia. Thus, the army size and composition corresponded to that of the army that Nakhtnebef I had raised in his battle in 373 BC. Djedhor I, who, as was customary in the past, wanted to have supreme command over all troops, did not react diplomatically to Agesilaus, since Agesilaus had probably expected supreme command, but was now only given supreme command over his Greek units.
Chabrias agreed to take command of about 200 well-equipped Egyptian ships. The fleet was probably divided into units of larger triremes and fast galleys with a crew of 30 rowers, which, according to Diodorus, were also used in this number under Nakhtnebef I in 373 BC. The Egyptians also had an excellent level of training due to the skills they had acquired in the Persian fleet during the first Persian rule. Chabrias traveled to Egypt before the planned attack and from there set off by sea towards Phoenicia to support Djedhor I in his activities. Nectanebo (II) was given the task of advancing with the Machimoi by land to the region of Chor in order to later unite with Djedhor I' troops.
Demise[]
Djedhor I' brother Tjaihepimu, who had been appointed governor of Egypt, took advantage of Djedhor I' absence to have his son Nakhthorheb I succeed him as the new pharaoh with the consent of the priests. Agesilaus accepted Nakhthorheb I's offer to switch sides and join him against Djedhor I. Chabrias, on the other hand, kept his promise to Djedhor I until Djedhor I fled, as agreed.
The sources of ancient historians unanimously confirm a successful rebellion against Djedhor I. The triggering reasons for the internal Egyptian unrest, however, remain obscure. It is by no means certain that Djedhor I was deposed because of the possibly dissatisfied priesthood. The range of possible causes is complex. It is not proven whether the priesthood actually took action against the tax policy. The effects of the tax policy on the lower income groups, where there is another potential danger, should not be underestimated. Djedhor I may also have been the focus of criticism because of excessive losses during his military advance.
It cannot be ruled out that the Persian prince Ochos, who took military action against the satrap revolts and Djedhor I during his father's lifetime, brought the Egyptian pharaoh into a threatening situation with a successful counter-offensive, which may have prompted the Egyptian general Tjaihepimu to hand over the supreme command to his son Nakhthorheb I. Chabrias returned to his homeland after the pharaoh's flight, probably through the intervention of Artaxerxes II in Athens. Since there are different versions of the events from ancient historians, the actual course of events remains unclear. The main sources on Djedhor I' Persian campaign and dethronement are Xenophon's, Plutarch's and Cornelius Nepos' biographies of Agesilaus as well as information in the 15th book of Diodorus's World History.
Xenophon (426 to 355 BC)[]
In Xenophon's story, Djedhor I was already planning a war against the Persians four years before the death of Agesilaus (359/358 BC). Agesilaus was pleased to be summoned by Djedhor I, as he promised him supreme command of the troops. After his arrival, Agesilaus discovered that Djedhor I had taken over the leadership of the attack, which is why Agesilaus felt deceived, but accepted the rank assigned to him. It then happened that parts of the Egyptian army kept their distance from their king. The uncertainty that arose in the Egyptian army led to numerous further desertions.
Djedhor I, now without a functioning army, fled to Sidon into Phoenician exile. The army, split into two camps, now had to decide which king to follow. Agesilaus chose the Egyptian king who he believed would be a loyal supporter of Sparta in the future. Agesilaus marched with this king against the enemy of the Hellenes and defeated him. He helped his (Egyptian) rival, who had raised large sums of money for the Lacedaemonians, to the throne. After that, Agesilaus set sail despite the winter to confront the enemy the following summer.
Cornelius Nepos (around 100 to 25 BC)[]
The records of Cornelius Nepos only indirectly attest to the deposition of Djedhor I. The campaign is not mentioned. Agesilaus went to Djedhor I at the age of 80 to support the pharaoh. After his arrival, Egyptian emissaries brought gifts, which Agesilaus refused to accept for the most part; except for the food and ointments, he sent the rest back. Without further details, Nepos describes that "King Nectanabis gave Agesilaus 220 talents." Agesilaus left Egypt with these gifts to bring them to his people. In the Menelaus harbor, between Cyrene and Egypt, Agesilaus died of an illness. His body was brought to Sparta.
Diodorus (1st century BC)[]
According to Diodorus, Djedhor I set out with an army made up of 10,000 selected Greek mercenaries and an infantry of 80,000 Egyptian soldiers. With this measure, the pharaoh acted against the advice of Agesilaus, who had recommended that Djedhor I stay in Egypt and let his generals lead the fighting. While the battle-ready army was camped near Phoenicia, a general who had remained behind in Egypt rebelled (according to other sources, this was Tjaihepimu). His son Nakhthorheb I was able to win over Djedhor I' troops, who had been ordered to besiege the cities in Syria. These actions developed into a larger war. After bribes and gifts, Nakhthorheb I gained supreme command of the entire Egyptian army, with which he returned to his homeland to conquer Egypt. In the meantime, Djedhor I travelled to Artaxerxes II via Arabia and asked for forgiveness for his attacks against the Persians. Artaxerxes II forgave him and appointed Djedhor I as general so that he could reconquer Egypt.
Shortly afterwards, Artaxerxes II died and Nakhthorheb I gathered an army of "more than a hundred thousand men" in Syria under his successor Artaxerxes III to attack Djedhor I. He therefore called on Djedhor I to "fight with him for the kingship". Agesilaus, who noticed Djedhor I' hesitation, advised him to accept the fight: "It is not the one with the larger army who wins, but the one who has more courage". Against Agesilaus' advice, Djedhor I retreated with him to a fortified city. Nakhthorheb I lost many men in his first attack, which is why he built a wall and a ditch around the city for tactical reasons. Djedhor I now feared for his safety. Agesilaus led a successful night-time sortie and defeated the pursuing troops of Nakhthorheb I. Djedhor I, who retained the kingship, gave Agesilaus valuable gifts in gratitude. On his way back home shortly afterwards, Agesilaus died.
Plutarch (45 to 125 AD)[]
Plutarch reports that Djedhor I and Nakhthorheb I took part in the campaign together during the reign of Artaxerxes II. Agesilaus was disappointed that Djedhor I was given command of the troops and is said to have characterized the pharaoh as pompous and vain. Nakhthorheb I, whom Plutarch classified as Djedhor I' cousin, defected with his army because he had meanwhile been proclaimed the new pharaoh in Egypt. With the promise of valuable gifts, Nakhthorheb I was able to persuade Agesilaus to consider converting. Nakhthorheb I also tried to win Chabrias over to his side, but in vain. Agesilaus asked Sparta for further instructions. After Sparta gave Agesilaus a free hand, he united with Nakhthorheb I's troops - allegedly in the interests of his hometown.
Without the support of Nakhthorheb I's army, Djedhor I fled. Plutarch now also tells of an "army of one hundred thousand men" that did not belong to Nakhthorheb I, but attacked him. The commander of this large force is said to have been a self-proclaimed Egyptian king from Mendes who rebelled against Nakhthorheb I. The latter - similar to Djedhor I in Diodorus - did not follow Agesilaus' advice to accept the challenge, but fled with the unwilling Spartan king into a fortified city. Also like Diodorus, Agesilaus later made a successful sortie from the city encircled by the enemy and won the victory. In this way, Nakhthorheb I was able to save his throne. He gave Agesilaus generous gifts and rewarded him with 230 talents of silver for his participation in the war. As winter had set in, Agesilaus sailed his ships close to land on his way home. He died in Menelaus' harbor near Libya at the age of 84.
Evaluation of ancient sources[]
Although Xenophon's writing is the source closest to Djedhor I's, it is not a neutral life of Agesilaus, but an encomion. In his Hellenika, however, Xenophon devoted no space to Agesilaus' last years. Diodorus probably based his information in a greatly abbreviated form on the 29-volume universal history of the Greek historian Ephorus of Cyme, who lived in the 4th century BC and who incorporated his anti-Persian attitude into his explanations. An analysis showed that Diodorus repeatedly used the information of Ephorus of Cyme for his narratives. Diodorus also appears to give the impression of giving objective and accurate reports of the events of that time. Several examples show that this is not the case.
In his depictions of the conflict between Djedhor I and Nakhthorheb I, Diodorus deviates strongly from the parallel tradition, which reports in particular that Agesilaus switched from Djedhor I to Nakhthorheb I. Diodorus also apparently has no clear definition of the term "Syria-Phoenicia", since in other places he describes the cities of Joppa, Samaria and Gaza as "Syrian-Phoenician". Archaeological excavations rule out destruction due to military sieges in Phoenicia for that period. It is therefore possible that Diodorus did not mean the surrounding towns by "Syrian-Phoenician cities", but rather "Syrian-Phoenician fortresses" in general, without any specific location, which were the target of Egyptian attacks.
Diodorus knew nothing of the turmoil that prevailed at the end of the reign of Artaxerxes II, as a result of which his son Ochos is said to have kept his father's death a secret for ten months. He immediately had Ochos succeed Artaxerxes II. Since Diodorus dated the death of Artaxerxes II to 362/361 BC, this results in an incorrect chronology of the military campaign, which Diodorus placed with the subsequent "battle between Djedhor I and Nakhthorheb I" in the reigns of the two Persian great kings. Diodorus later reported in a confusing and contradictory way in retrospect, since on the one hand he had no knowledge of the military order against Djedhor I that Artaxerxes II gave to his son Ochos, and on the other hand he linked Ochos's fighting with events in 351 BC.
Diodorus' claim that "Djedhor I went to Artaxerxes II via Arabia" to seek asylum there is not comprehensible and refers to sources from other historians who refer to Cambyses II, who "marched through northern Arabia to Babylonia". The normal route to the court of the Persian Great King ran through Straton's Phoenician territories. Djedhor I' escape "via Arabia" does not seem logical, since the pharaoh was near Sidon and would certainly only have chosen this detour if Straton had taken military action against Djedhor I with the Persian prince Ochos. From a later source it is known that Straton broke the existing alliance with the Persians and rebelled together with Egypt against the Persian Great King. The importance that Diodorus attached to the "route via Arabia" remains unclear. However, his statement seems unconvincing in the overall context of the other contradictory stories.
What is particularly striking is the constant presence of Greek mercenary troops in connection with Egypt. Diodorus' glorification of Greek generals and mercenaries is striking. In his stories, they are repeatedly called upon to carry out particularly difficult tasks on the front lines of war, and their tactical advice is also sought after. Diodorus denies the Persians and Egyptians these qualities, because they are the ones who need Greek help. Diodorus's information is therefore very questionable overall, which is why a certain historical confirmation of the details described cannot be made.