| “ | "The crisis in Indonesia has been repeatedly analyzed by Indonesian commentators as a failure of leadership and a collapse of public confidence. From the outsider's point of view, it looks at times less like failure and more like frustration of leadership, induced by refusal of leaders to allow each other what the Indonesian Parliament regularly votes to each new Cabinet and then as regularly in effect denies it, that is, the "opportunity to act." It looks at times also less like the collapse of public confidence and more like an even more dangerous and less easily curable public political fatigue, induced by the endless and fruitless search for "the way out," a search which even a strong new government would be all too frequently to continue." – Willard A. Hanna. | ” |
The cause for the collapse of liberal democracy in Indonesia has been the subject of debate by numerous scholars of Indonesian History. In this debate, Harry Benda, Herbert Feith, and Daniel Lev, all agree that liberal democracy in Indonesia was doomed. Yet all of them disagree on the exact cause for the collapse. Harry Benda argued that the liberal democracy, had failed because the belief and culture of Indonesia were not compatible with such a form of government. Herbert Feith argued that the collapse of liberal democracy was caused by the struggle between "administrators", who were leaders with the administrative, technical, legal and foreign-language skills required to run the distinctive modern apparatus of modern state, and "solidarity maker", who were leaders skilled as mediators between groups at different levels of modernity and political effectiveness, as mass organizers, and as manipulators of integrative symbols".
Meanwhile, Daniel Lev stated that the military was the one which destroyed the liberal democracy, as it found itself better able to run the country than the civilians. But in fact, the collapse of liberal democracy was not inevitable. Liberal democracy simply collapsed because Sukarno wanted to see it collapse in 1958. However, Sukarno's ability of to destroy liberal democracy was only due to a culmination of a chain of effects that exacerbated the political atmosphere in Indonesia. These chain of effects consists of the reasons previously mentioned, and somewhat remains in the present state of Indonesian politics. But for a moment, imagine if things had gone differently. Imagine if, through a certain chain of events (as well as sheer luck), the liberal democracy had survived; How would such a change even occur?
Point of Divergence
On 17 August 1950, the process of forming a new cabinet for the fledgling nation began. In the following says, President Sukarno conducted several hearings with representatives of several major parties, consulting each of them in turn on the matter of the composition and program of a new cabinet. On the 21st, Sukarno appointed Mohammad Natsir – leader of the Masyumi – as formateur. After several weeks of negotiations, Natsir almost had a deal with the National Party (PNI), and on September 3 came close to forming a cabinet with the PNI. But then, however, the army entered the picture. Many in the army opposed Natsir's choice for defense minister – former Deputy Prime Minister – Abdul Hakim Harahap.
By this point, the PNI had agreed to Abdul Hakim Harahap's nomination, and pulling back would lead to re-opening negotiations. So, Natsir faced a choice: either he would take heed of the army's position (thereby re-opening negotiations) or not take heed of the army's position and retain Abdul Hakim Harahap (thereby worsening relations with the army). In OTL, Natsir took heed of the army's position. In the new rounds of negotiations, the PNI grew less co-operative, and Natsir eventually resorted to forming his own cabinet with the smaller parties, leaving the PNI to join the Communist Party (PKI) and the Murba Party in the opposition. This alternate history, however, asks what would have happened had Natsir decided to throw his lot with the PNI, pushing the Masyumi towards a cabinet with the PNI?
Basic guidelines
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