Alternative History
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Scimitar International
Scimitar International
Formation 1990s
Type Military contractor
Legal status Presumed active
Purpose/focus Paramilitary services
Headquarters Giresun Island, Black Sea
Former name Private Response and Military Defense Services

Scimitar International, also simply known as Scimitar, is a private military firm which surfaced in several western Asian conflict zones following the Doomsday catastrophe. Since 2005, it has been described as a paramilitary group, a mercenary network for unemployed former Turkish and Soviet military personnel, and the private army of General Cengiz Akyüz, de facto military leader of Trabzon, who is thought to financially back the organization. Scimitar came to prominence during its participation in several local conflicts in the Eastern Turkish Wasteland during the mid 2000s. It has also conducted activities in Kalmykia and Dagestan.

History[]

Background[]

Doomsday came suddenly for Turkey and the Soviet Union, triggering the collapse of their respective national defense structures. Thousands of Turkish and Soviet military personnel deserted or found themselves cut off from their governments and left to fend for themselves, particularly during the chaotic conventional war which raged on the eastern border between Turkey and the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic throughout most of 1983. Many of the soldiers turned to banditry to survive, or set up miniature fiefdoms to govern areas in the absence of civil authority - this formed the basis for many Turkish and Soviet successor states in the region, such as the Empire of Trabzon, Republic of Greater Patnos, and Republic of Mangystau. Others developed a reputation as guns for hire, selling their services to foreign governments and militant factions in the post-Doomsday period. Many professional career soldiers were still eager for opportunities in lawless areas where "quick rich" opportunities abounded, and had few other marketable skills.

Reports of an organization advertising broad "private military services" began appearing in the late 1990s. It was known by several names, but in English-language communiques, identified itself as "Private Response and Military Defense Services" (PRMDS). PRMDS was known for its flashy and multi-lingual marketing, and attempts to portray itself as more legitimate than the disorganized bands of hired guns which proliferated in the immediate post-Doomsday era. The marketing material emphasized that PRMDS was less a threat to regional stability as it was an enforcer of peace, one could function as a highly disciplined and well-organized entity accountable to international and national leaders. It boasted that its ranks included members of prestigious units of the former Turkish and Soviet armed forces, including commanders and enlisted personnel from the defunct 1980s Soviet Fourth Army (specifically the 23rd Guards Motor Rifle Division), Soviet Seventh Army, and Turkish Third Army. PRMDS also advertised the services of personnel from former Soviet and Turkish missile and air defense brigades, and artillery regiments. Its sources of funding, number of personnel and equipment, and headquarters remained unclear.

Elazig[]

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Captured vehicle allegedly crewed by PRMDS operators near Elazig, 2004.

In 1998, the Sultanate of Turkey invaded the Republic of Hatay, sparking the largest military conflict between two Turkish successor states outside the Eastern Turkish Wasteland. The republic's military forces had been severely degraded by a failed expedition in Kurdistan four years earlier, and entered the conflict much weaker than the Sultanate, which had inherited the bulk of Turkey's pre-Doomsday military equipment, personnel, and resources. By 2000, the Sultanate had formally annexed the republic and stamped out the last holdouts of resistance by remnants of the Hatayan regime.

As the Sultanate considered itself the only legitimate successor to the pre-Doomsday Turkish nation, its political leadership yearned to "restore" the country to its borders as they existed in 1983. Flush with success over the annexation of Hatay, the Sultanate's generals next urged an offensive on the neighboring Elazig. The Elazigi regime was not unprepared for this eventuality; when the Turkish-Hatayan War broke out in 1998, it had ordered a general mobilization of the entire male population aged 18-60, and looked into other ways to bolster its defense. Nevertheless, the state was much smaller than Hatay both in terms of resources and manpower, and lacked even a fraction of the latter's military capabilities. Lacking any kind of distinct national identity, Elazig also had to deal with a large pro-Sultanate segment in its population, who considered themselves Turkish patriots. The Sultanate's legal claims to legitimacy, appeals to Turkish nationalism, and use of the pre-Doomsday Turkish national symbols and rhetoric resonated especially well with many Elazigis.

Facing an increasingly disloyal civilian population and having to rely on an unreliable conscript army, Elazigi officials contacted PRMDS. The organization was tasked with making preparations for a defensive ground campaign, securing arms, reorganizing logistics, and providing support services for the fledgling Elazigi military, as well as putting down any domestic civil unrest - a task the regime was reluctant to entrust to local conscripts. Journalists in Konya quickly expressed alarm at the "flood" of military equipment into Elazig, as well as what they decried as a "silent invasion" by "Russian mercenaries".

The PRMDS military mission in Elazig probably numbered no more than 300 personnel, including a sprinkling of Russians though mostly Turkish and Turkic-speaking troops, but they were able to have an effect utterly disproportionate to their size. Experienced ex-Soviet officers planned to secure Elazig's western border with a chain of forts and trenches, guarded by combined arms units with dug-in artillery and armor. As Elazig possessed little artillery, armor, or air defense, the organization used Elazigi money and its own connections to procure old Soviet field guns and anti-aircraft guns. Turkish artillery pieces from the Doomsday era were also salvaged and returned to working order. Armored cars were acquired from Kurdish arms dealers; initially in decrepit condition, they were restored, manned, and maintained by the mercenaries.

More importantly, PRMDS organized, equipped, and trained the first Elazigi military unit made of professional soldiers; this was known as the 36th Infantry Brigade. The 36th answered directly to the general staff, subverting the military's normal chain of command, allowing it to be mobilized to put down disloyal units as necessary. It also functioned as a de facto praetorian guard for the country's political leaders, and was the only serious source of resistance to the Sultanate's forces when the long-awaited invasion came.

The reorganization of Elazig's forces could not have gone unnoticed in Konya, and probably accelerated the urgency of planning and preparing for the coming offensive. In October 2004, the Sultanate's forces launched a blitzkrieg-style invasion of Elazig, hoping to seize the capital and decapitate its miniature army within days. Instead, due to the successful efforts of PRMDS, the invasion took six months. Many Elazigi units melted away, but others were able to hold out thanks to the extensive network of trenches and fortified bunkers constructed along the country's western border. The 36th Brigade did not surrender and offered tenacious resistance until it was virtually wiped out. By late March 2005, Sultanate troops had broken through the last Elazigi defensive lines and surrounded the capital. With no heavy weapons and ammunition remaining, the Elazigi military leadership surrendered on March 23.

No PRMDS operators were captured alive during the hostilities in Elazig, and accounts of some being killed in combat with Sultanate forces are difficult to verify. The surviving operators were reportedly evacuated by helicopter in early 2005 before the Sultanate forces could cut off the Elazigi capital.

Kalmykia[]

Mi-17 Scimitar1

Cheap, reliable and robust: one of two ex-Soviet Mi-17 helicopters operated by PRMDS (now Scimitar) in Kalmykia.

After the fall of Elazig, PRMDS began advertising its services beyond the conventional military sphere, offering both armed and unarmed private security services in central and western Asia. These services included personalized security details, security details for static infrastructure and key installations, and traveler escort and protection. The government of Kalmykia soon contracted PRMDS to provide security for groups of civilians traveling from Kalmykia to Tibet for Buddhist pilgrimages. In addition to armed guards escorting the civilians on the ground, PRMDS would overfly select sections of the pilgrimage route with a single Mil Mi-17 "Hip" helicopter to provide early detection of bandit ambushes.

Dagestan[]

The rise of militant Islamic extremism in Chechnya accompanied the disintegration of Soviet rule in Central Asia, and radical paramilitaries frequently launched armed incursions of the neighboring Republic of Dagestan during the 1990s. The incursions were halted by Dagestani security forces and local militias after several bloody engagements. During the early 2000s, Dagestan was granted a reprieve while the Chechen regime was preoccupied elsewhere; however, in 2004, preparations were made to resume organized incursions in concert with the Muslim Liberation Army. Dagestani intelligence soon became aware of these efforts in 2010, and it was rumored that ex-Soviet military careerists in the Dagestani army were making contact with their old colleagues freelancing with PRMDS to guard the border.

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PRMDS reaction force engages the MLA near the Dagestani border, 2010.

What is apparent is that PRMDS secured a contract from Dagestan to curb Chechen and MLA militant activity near the border between June and July 2010. Previous incursions had failed to get very far into Dagestan before being detected and engaged by army units; however, the long expanse of border with Chechnya was simply too vulnerable to hit-and-run raids against isolated frontier posts and villages, which were often plundered for supplies and unwilling Muslim recruits. PRMDS began mapping reports of militant activity and identifying possible weapons caches and infiltration routes. Using small, mobile reaction forces equipped primarily with light, fast-moving armored cars and air support from overflying Mil Mi-17s, the mercenaries could react quickly to reports of militants. They also armed, retrained, and reorganized village militias near the border to operate in concert with their reaction teams. The entire border with Chechnya was divided into broad sectors, with settlements in each sector linked to a low-band VHF radio network which could be used to update and summon the reaction force from the mercenaries' fortified sector base as needed.

By early 2011, PRMDS had destroyed so many arms caches and intercepted and killed so many Chechen and MLA raiders that the Dagestani government was able to declare the border with Chechnya secure for the first time since the 1980s. Sporadic security-related incidents still occurred, but for the time being it seemed armed incursions were a thing of the past. The ruling extremists in Chechnya, who had planned a major offensive that year, were forced to cancel their plans.

On May 11, 2011, the MLA carried out several bombings of a PRMDS base in Dagestan, located north of Igali. The attack left 3 Turkish contractors and a Dagestani policeman dead.

Rebranding and alleged links to Trabzon[]

PRMDS was rebranded Scimitar International in January 2018, adopting a new emblem which depicts a white scimitar. The Kızgın Society, a human rights organization and advocacy group staffed by Trabzonian exiles, responded by publishing a report the following month claiming that a "Scimitar International" was publicly listed as a closed corporation in Trabzon. According to these public details, it had two directors: General Cengiz Akyüz and Ndirbek Musayev, an Uzbek-born former Soviet military officer who was granted Trabzonian residence during the early 2000s. Akyüz was Trabzon's Minister of Interior and sat on the country's (de facto) ruling administrative council. Musayev owned one of a small handful of pharmaceutical importers and manufacturers tasked with supplying public hospitals and military clinics with drugs. His background in contracting with the Trabzonian armed forces, his business and military connections in Central Asia, and his apparently close relationship with a member of the country's ruling elite make him an ideal middleman to obscure direct involvement in Scimitar's activities by the Trabzonian state.

The Kızgın Society report claimed that PRMDS, and now Scimitar, is a partial proxy force for the Trabzonian regime. It alleges that Musayev was probably the group's original founder and director; however, he found it difficult to support his activities and needed external investors. He approached the military regime in Trabzon because it could supply him with materiel as well as financial aid, as well as more manpower for his organization. Akyüz was not yet on the administrative council, but was the youngest officer on the general staff, with plenty of ambition. He saw in PRMDS the opportunity to subcontract high-risk operations in faraway conflict zones to give the Trabzonian armed forces a screen of plausible deniability, and drum up much-needed foreign exchange. The government was desperate for cash, and "renting out" its skilled military personnel was a potentially lucrative form of income. Meanwhile, PRMDS could be used to indirectly serve Trabzonian foreign policy goals abroad. For example, the Elazigi contract was taken with the full blessing and financial backing of the regime because it too perceived the Sultanate as an existential threat, and Elazig as a useful buffer state. As pre-Doomsday era personnel are killed off or age out of the business, their place is taken by more recent Trabzonian recruits.

In the wake of the report's release, Musayev issued no comment. Akyüz addressed the allegations in an open letter to the foreign press, denying that Scimitar had any legal existence in Trabzon - calling it a "foreign entity" outside Trabzon's realm of jurisdiction or administrative influence, and pointing out that mercenary activity is not permitted under Trabzonian law.

Trabzon-born journalist Fatma Karademir, a prominent defector, published a rebuttal to the Kızgın Society and Akyüz in a series of editorials published in Konya newspapers. She hypothesized that Scimitar was not the result of any formal alliance between Musayev and the Trabzonian state, suggesting instead it could very well have been a private venture between Musayev and Akyüz, who was in a position to repurpose state resources as he pleased for his personal affairs. Karademir also ridiculed Akyüz's description of Scimitar as a foreign entity, stating that it was common knowledge the organization was headquartered on Giresun Island, which is only a kilometer from the Trabzonian coast, and is believed to have training camps on the mainland.

2023 Trabzon coup d'état attempt[]

In March 2023, General Ali Ulutaş, chairman of Trabzon's administrative council, attempted a coup d'état. The coup plotters surrounded key installations and sent tanks into the streets of Trabzon on March 11-12. The orchestrators of the coup, led by Ulutaş, declared themselves the "Military Revolutionary Commission for the Government of National Salvation". Their mission was to establish a new ruling council and preempt an anticipated succession crisis due to the increasingly isolated status and alleged poor health of country's ailing monarch. In his appeal to the Trabzonian people, Ulutaş implied that political freedoms would be respected and popular reforms undertaken by the new commission. He also dismissed the other sitting members of the administrative council, including General Akyüz.

For almost two days, the coup plotters attempted but failed to establish control in Trabzon. They neglected to cut the telephone lines to the interior ministry, allowing Akyüz to continue to make calls from his office. Akyüz and other members of the administrative council sent aides to persuade the capital troops to mobilize against the coup, but were met with widespread apathy and mixed loyalties. When it became clear that the majority of the army was content to sit on the sidelines and see how events played out, Akyüz contacted the Scimitar headquarters in Giresun and arranged to have the mercenaries retake the capital.

Coup Trabzon1

Rebel tank knocked out by Scimitar contractors during the coup attempt, March 2023.

On the morning of March 13, Mil Mi-17 helicopters carrying several companies of Scimitar troops landed at the Trabzon Air Base, which the coup plotters had failed to secure. They were equipped with rocket-propelled grenades and old Soviet wire-guided anti-tank missiles to destroy or disable the tanks blocking the access roads to the capital. Within six hours, they had killed or captured almost 200 alleged dissident soldiers and destroyed two tanks and several other military vehicles. Ulutaş, who hoped to resolve the coup without bloodshed, did not equip his supporters with enough ammunition for a prolonged firefight and most surrendered after brief skirmishes throughout the capital.

Ulutaş remained barricaded in the radio station with a small group of his remaining soldiers. Shortly after dark, Scimitar and loyalist military personnel entered the grounds. The general was ordered to surrender or face an assault - when no response was received after thirty minutes, the attackers stormed the building. Ulutaş was shot dead, along with several of his followers.

Scimitar's participation in the counter-coup seemed to confirm the suspicions of its close ties to the Trabzonian state and Akyüz, who promptly assumed de facto the reins of power. The Scimitar operators in Trabzon continued to assist in patrols and establishing checkpoints throughout the capital to preempt a possible uprising by civilians sympathetic to the coup. They were withdrawn to Giresun without incident on March 25.

Later activities in Trabzon[]

In September 2023, Scimitar was contracted to assist with the reformation of Trabzon's Air and Air Defense Corps, which had effectively ceased to exist almost two decades earlier due to difficulty servicing its aircraft and air defense systems. The company is believed to have transferred a number of anti-aircraft guns captured from the MLA in Dagestan to Trabzon, and by the end of the month was training Trabzonian crews in their use.

Akyüz also announced his intention to procure new aircraft for the Trabzonian Armed Forces, and set up a flight school at the capital airport to train military pilots. Scimitar has been contracted to set up the flight school, and was believed to be recruiting pilots and negotiating the procurement of several light aircraft on the Trabzonian government's behalf.

Recruitment and organization[]

Scimitar's recruitment is rather opaque, much like the rest of the organization. In 2023, it was believed to have up to 5,000 employees and contractors, with a large plurality from Trabzon and smaller numbers from other nations in the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is also thought that a number of Scimitar's senior officers and technicians began their careers in the armies of Hatay and Elazig, and were recruited after the annexation of those states by the Turkish Sultanate.

Independent Turkish media outlets and researchers have usually located Scimitar's headquarters on Giresun Island, off the coast of the Trabzonian port city of Giresun. The island houses the company's administrative offices, a radio transmitter, and a small logistics hub for ammunition, fuel, and machine parts. The administrative building and warehouses are believed to have been built on the remains of a first century Roman fort (and later Byzantine monastery) which previously existed in the center of the island.

Most Scimitar recruits from Trabzon and the western Caucasus are trained in camps located on the mainland in Giresun Province. Recruits from Central Asia are trained elsewhere, possibly in Dagestan, where the firm continues to operate a network of bases near the border with Chechnya. Since mid-2023, the Armed Forces of Trabzon have supplied Scimitar employees with Trabzonian passports and access to domestic military health services.

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Sentry at an alleged Scimitar checkpoint in the city of Giresun, 2021.

Since the 2010s, there have been multiple allegations of Giresun's modest port facilities being "functionally controlled" by Scimitar. Scimitar personnel, rather than the Trabzonian police or armed forces, provide security for the port. In 2019, the Kızgın Society alleged that the port was "headed by a former Soviet Navy captain employed by the organization previously known as PRMDS and now as Scimitar, and de facto owned by business magnate Ndirbek Musayev". Aside from Trabzon itself, the port is the only one in the country with a license granted by the state for the import and export of military weapons.

During its early years of existence, Scimitar was reportedly armed with subpar weapons and little heavy or sophisticated equipment. During its contracts in Elazig and Dagestan, Scimitar primarily utilized the military infrastructure, arms, and kit of its local partners. It eventually came to amass a large stockpile of Soviet arms captured from the MLA in Dagestan and originally supplied by Chechnya. The firm was also able to purchase a number of previously unserviceable equipment types, including ex-Soviet Mi-17 helicopters, on regional gray and black markets in central Asia and restore them to working order. Prior to 2011, Serbia was Scimitar's leading supplier of military hardware, and large volumes of weapons, ammunition, and personal gear sourced from that country remain in service.

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